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I. INTRODUCTION 
The concept of contract is the "union of the ideas of agreement and 
obligation ." 1  Social contract theories seek to legitimate civil authority by 
appealing to notions of rational agreement. 2 These d iverse theories of 
morality, politics, and law posit actual or hypothetical circumstances of pre­
regulated society, termed the "state of nature"3 in early modern social 
contract theories and the "original position" in John Rawls ' s  theory .  4 Social 
contract theories provide that rational individuals will agree by contract, 
compact, or covenant to give up the condition of unregulated freedom in 
exchange for the security of a civil society governed by a just, binding rule 
of law. 
The legal system of the United States has an important relationship to 
social contract theory. 5 Scholars believe social contractarian6 philosophy 
1. WELLSTOOD A WATT, THE THEORY OF CONTRACT IN ITS SOCIAL LIGHT 1 (1897). 
2. See, e.g. , THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 132-33 (Michael Oak:eshott ed., MacMillan 
1977) (1651 ); JoHN LocKE, An Essay Concerning the True, Original, Extent and End of Civil 
Government: Second Treatise on Government, in SOCIAL CONTRACT 3, 10-11 (Oxford Univ. Press 
1962) (1690); JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, On the Social Contract, in THE BASIC POLITICAL 
WRITINGS 141 (Donald A Cress ed. & trans., Hackett Publ'g 1987) (1762). 
3. Locke, supra note 2, at 4. 
4. JoHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 17-22 (1971). Rawls revived scholarly interest in 
social contract theories. His theory has been widely discussed, criticized, and applied in diverse 
scholarly legal and philosophical circles. See, e.g. , Charles W. Collier, Intellectual Authority and 
Institutional Authority, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 151, 167-68 (1992); Norman Daniels, Health-Care 
Needs and Distributive Justice, 10 PHIL. &PuB. AFF. 146, 161-65 (1981); John M. Evans, Let Our 
Parents Run: Removing the Judicial Barriers for Parental Governance of Local Schools, 19 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 963, 1007-08 (1992); George P. Fletcher, Law and Morality: A Kantian 
Perspecti-ve, 87 CoLUM. L. REv. 533, 543-44 (1987); Thomas M. Franck, Is Justice Relevant to 
the International Legal System?,  64 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 945, 951-54 (1989); W. Robert Gray, 
The Essential-Functions Limitation on the Civil Rights of People with Disabilities and John 
Rawls's Concept of Social Justice, 22 N.M. L. REv. 295 (1992); Wendy Collins Perdue, Personal 
Jurisdiction and the Beetle in the Box, 32 B.C. L. REv. 529, 546-47 (1991); David AJ. Richards, 
Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the First Amendment, 123 U.  PA. L. 
REv. 45,60 (1974) [hereinafter Richards, Free Speech]; David AJ. Richards, Human Rights and 
the Moral Foundations of the Substantive Criminal Law, 13 GA. L. REv. 1395, 1408-13 (1979) 
[hereinafter Richards, Human Rights]; Eleanor Swift, A Foundation Fact Approach to Hearsay, 
75 CAL. L. REv. 1339, 1375 n.108 (1987); Andrew E. Wetzler, Note, The Ethical Underpinnings 
of the Endangered Species Act, 13 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 145, 178-79 (1993); Jeffrey Abramson, Ronald 
Dworkin and the Convergence of Law and Political Philosophy, 65 TEX. L. REv. 1201, 1202-08 
( 1987) (book review); Richard Schmal beck, The Justice of Economics: An Analysis of Wealth 
Maximization as a Normative Goal, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 488,510-12 (1983) (book review). 
5. See ALFRED H. KELLY ET AL., THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION ITS ORIGINS AND 
DEVELOPMENT 118 (6th ed. 1983); THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION at viii-ix 
(Michael Kanunen ed., 1986); Andrew C. McLaughlin, Social Compact and Constitutional 
Constn�ction, 5 AM. HisT. REv. 467, 467 (1900) ("Students of American history or political 
philosophy need not be told that in the Revolutionary period men believed that society originated 
in compact."); see also BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN 
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influenced the founding of the United States and its Constitution.7 
According to some historians, the American colonists relied upon liberal, 
Lockean notions of a social contract to spirit rebellion against unwanted 
British rule. 8 Historians have maintained that social contractarian theories 
of political order significantly influenced the people who wrote and 
defended the Declaration of Independence, the original Constitution, and 
the B ill of Rights. 9 Legal scholars have assumed or argued the propriety of 
REVOLUTION 58-59 (1967); ARTIIURE. SUTHERLAND, CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA: ORIGIN 
AND EVOLUTION OF ITS FUNDAMENT ALlDEAS 6 ( 1965); GoRDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE 
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 282-91 (1969); Louis Henkin,RevolutionsandConstitutions, 
49 LA. L. REv. 1023, 1029 (1989); Thad W. Tate, The Social Contract in Amen·ca, 1774-1787: 
Revolutionary Theory as a Conservative Instrument, 22 WM. & MARY Q. 375, 376 (1965). 
6. Early Americans often used the terms "compact," and "covenant" synonymously with 
"contract." See WooD, supra note 5, at 541 (quoting a colonial era writer who treated the words 
compact, agreement, covenant, and bargain as synonyms); see also CLINToN RossiTER, SEEDTIME 
OF THE REPUBLIC: THE ORIGIN OF THE AMERICAN TRADffiON OF POLITICAL LIBERTY 40 5 ( 19 53) 
(noting that "Colonial writers used the words compact, contract, or covenant"). Still, as Rossiter 
suggests, each of the three terms has its own history and connotations. See id. at 53 (describing 
the original Puritan concept of "covenant" as instrumental in helping to swell the broader social 
contract idea). 
7. See PAULINE MAIER, FROM RESISTANCE TO REVOLUTION 27 (1972) (noting that social 
contractarian thinkers generated "a corpus of ideas about public and popular authority and popular 
political responsibilities that shaped the American revolutionary movement"); JoHN 
WITHERSpOON, LECTURES ON MORAL Pl-rrLOSOPHY 45 (Jack Scott ed., 1982 ); Andrea Brenneke, 
Civil Rights Remedies for Battered Women: Axiomatic & Ignored, 11 LAW &INEQ. 1, 18 (1992) 
("American civil rights theory derives in part from the 1 '? century 'social contract' tradition 
. . . .  ");Martin C. Loesch, Motive Testimony and a Civil Disobedience Justification, 5 NoTRE 
DAME J.L. Emrcs & PuB. PoL'Y 1069, 1074 (1991) ("The Revolution in America in 1776 found 
philosophical foundation in the social contract theorists . . . .  "). See generally John F. Fenton, Jr., 
The Theory of the Social Compact and Its Influence Upon the American Revolution 37-65 ( 1891) 
(unpublished doctoral thesis, Columbia College) (on file with author) (discussing the impact of 
social contractarian thought on colonial America). 
8. See, e.g. , WITHERSPOON, supra note 7. But see STEVEN M. DwoRETZ, THE 
UNVARNISHED DOCTRINE : LOCKE, LffiERALISM, AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 5-7 (1990) 
(stating that by the 1960s historians began to regard liberal Lockean contractarianism as having 
little influence on pre-revolutionary American political thought compared to civic republican 
influences); James T. Kloppenberg, The Virtues ofLiberalism: Chn.stianity, Republicanism, and 
Ethics in Early American Political Discourse, 74 J. AM. HisT. 9, 9-33 ( 1987) (depicting Lockean 
liberalism as only one of three significant intellectual influences in early America). 
9. See State v. Clark, 592 S. W.2d 709,721 (Mo. 1979) ("History tells us that the Framers 
.. . were influenced by the teachings of Aristotle, Locke, Rousseau, and others, and by the social 
contract concept they espoused. "); CARL BECKER, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: A STIJDY 
INTI-IEHISTORYOFPOLffiCALlDEAS A.27-31, 62-63,79 (1972);KELLYET AL., supra note 5, at 118; 
Wendy E. Parmet, Health Care and the Constitution: Public Health and the Role of the State in 
the Framing Era, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 267, 310 (1993) ("To Americans searching for a way 
to legitimate their separation from England, social contract theory provided an ideal 
inspiration .... Jefferson relied upon the rhetoric of social contract theory in the Declaration of 
Independence . . .. State constitutions, and ultimately the federal one, were conceived as new 
1999] DUNWODY ARTICLE 5 
influence on the founding of the United States dispute the degree to which 
exposure to social contractarian philosophy may have influenced particular 
historical figures, for example, John Quincy Adams, Thomas Jefferson, and 
James Madison. 14 
A great deal has been written about the seeming social contractarian 
foundations of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. 
However, little has been written about the roles social contractarian 
thought may have played in subsequent jurisprudence in the United States .  
Indeed, one prominent scholar has concluded that "[t]he idea of the social 
contract implicit in America' s  rights ideology served the new nation well 
at the beginning, but had no further use." 1 5 
My central thesis is that the idea of the social contract has had 
noteworthy uses since the American Revolution. As discussed below, the 
idea of the social contract as a source of legitimate and consensual 
authority has surfaced in constitutional, statutory, and common law cases 
in this century and the last. 16 Judicial opinions relating to matters as varied 
WillS, INVENTING Alv!ERICA: JEFFERSON'S DECLARATION O F  INDEPENDENCE 23 9 ( 1978) ("Jefferson 
drew his ideas and words from these men, who stood at a conscious and deliberate distance from 
Locke's political principles.") with Mn..LER, supra note 12, at 170 ("If any one man can be said 
to have dominated the political philosophy of the American Revolution, it is John Locke."); cf 
Ronald Hamowy, Jefferson and the Scottish Enlightenment: A Cn.tique of Gary Wills's Inventing 
America: Jefferson's Declaration of Independence, 36 WM. & MARY Q. 503, 505-08 (1979) 
(assessing evidence ofLocke's influence on Jefferson). 
14. See, e.g., ADRIENNE KOCH, THEPHlLOSOPHYOF THOMASJEFFERSON 140-41 (1957); THE 
MIND OF TI-IE FOUNDER: SOURCES OFTI-IE PO UTI CAL THOUGHT OF J Alvf.ES MADISON xx.iii-xxi V, 3 67, 
420, 439 (Marvin Meyers ed., 1981). Recent courts have cited Madison's appeal to the social 
contract to explain the evils of bills of attainder and ex post facto laws. See State v. Myers, 923 
P.2d 1024, 1030 (Kan. 1996); State v. Cookman, 920 P.2d 1086, 1092 (Or. 1996). 
15. Henkin, supra note 5, at 1033; cf United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 
1220 (9th Cir. 1988), rev 'd 494 U.S. 259 ( 1990) (finding that framers rights ideology explicated 
by reference to the state of nature). 
16. An interesting social contractarian legacy is article 1, section 1 of the Connecticut 
Constitution. SeeM. Kate Curran, Note, Illegal Aliens, the Social Compact and the Connecticut 
Constitution, 13 BRIDGEPORTL REv. 331 (1993) (concluding that the state constitution "expressly 
incorporates a social compact theory of government"). Article I, section 1 of the Connecticut 
Constitution provides that "All men when they form a social compact, are equal in rights; and no 
man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community." 
This provision has surfaced in the case law as a source of alleged rights and duties. See, e .g. ,  
Hilton v. City ofNew Haven, 661 A.2d 973, 984 (Conn. 1995) (constitutionality of decision to 
close overflow homeless shelter); Moore v. Ganim, 660 A.2d 742, 749-50 (Conn. 1995) 
(constitutionality of statute terminating general assistance benefit). 
A similar social contractarian equal protection clause appears in the Texas Constitution. See 
Rodriguez v. Motor Express, Inc., 909 S.W.2d 521, 526 (Tex. App. 1995) (quoting TEX. CONST. 
ART. 1, § 3 ). Such a clause, but declaring all "freemen" who join in compact as equal, was deleted 
from the Alabama state constitution. See Pinto v. Alabama Coalition for Equity, 662 So. 2d 894, 
909 (Ala. 1995) (Houston, J., concurring). 
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advancing social contractarian arguments for or against doctrinal traditions 
and innovations in law. 10 Professor David A.J. Richards has argued both 
that American law has roots in the social contract tradition, and that the 
social contract tradition has direct implications for how courts ought to 
interpret provisions of the Constitution today: social contractarian 
influences on constitutionalism in the United States justify adopting 
normative social contractarian analysis as a framework for constitutional 
interpretations of religious freedom, free speech, and personal privacy. 11 
Scholars disagree about the precise character of the relationship 
between U. S .  law and social contractarian thought. 12 They dispute the 
extent to which liberal philosophy, as opposed to civic republican 
philosophy, guided the founding. They also dispute the extent to which the 
seminal ideas of John Locke and other liberal social con tractarians played 
a role .  1 3  Moreover, scholars who accept a significant social contractarian 
social contracts.") (footnotes omitted). See generally Fenton, supra note 7. 
10. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 
HAR.v. L. REv. 1667, 1718 (1975) ("[P]arallels between private and public law appear ultimately 
to stem from a contractarian view of the state as an artificial person."\ Edward J. Sullivan, Lucas 
and Creative Constitutional Interpretation, 23 ENVTL. L. 919,919 (1993) (certain "cases have 
eroded the underpinnings of the social contract which underlies environmental regulation"); Cass 
R. Sunstein,Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 CouJM:. L. REv. 1432, 1435 (1988) 
("[t ]he underlying theory [of the early period of administrative law] was based on notions of social 
contract"); see also Aileen M. Bigelow, In the Ghetto: The State's Duty to Protect Inner-City 
Children from Violence, 7 NoTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PuB. PoL'Y 533, 556-59 (1993) (arguing 
that the social contract requires states to protect iMer-city children from violence); BreMeke, 
supra note 7, at 19-22 (arguing that the state's failure to enforce the social contract, in favor of 
women, leads to spousal abuse); Gordon A Christenson, Using Human Rights Law to Inform Due 
Process and Equal Protection Analyses, 52 CINCINNATI L. REv. 3, 12-13 (1983) (using social 
contract theory to enforce international human rights); Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of 
Privacy, 1992 WIS. L. REv. 1335, 1409-13; Stephen Holmes, Welfare Rights as Property Rights, 
in RESPONSIBILITY, RIGHTS, AND WELFARE: THE THEORY OF THE WELFARE STATE 88 (J. Donald 
Moon ed., 1988) (stating that the duty to help the poor is founded on the social contract); Gerald 
L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 YALE L.J. 909, 923-27 (1991 )(finding that aliens' rights 
are based on the social contract). 
11. See DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION (1986); see also 
Richards, Human Rights, supra note 4, at 1404-05; Richards, Free Speech, supra note 4, at 60-61. 
12. A popular traditional reading of history assigned a large role to contractarian thought. 
See, e.g., DWORETZ, supra note 8, at 5-6; JOHN C. MILLER, 0R1GINS OF THE AMER1CAN 
REVOLUTION 170-76 (1943); see also BAILYN, supra note 5, at 58-59. Scholars began to read the 
history differently in the 1960s. See, e.g. ,  DwoRETZ, supra note 8, at 6; cf Daniel T. Rodgers, 
Republicanism: The Career of a Concept, 79 J. A\1. HlsT. 11, 13-17 ( 1992) (accounting for the 
"paradigm shift" that, in the 1960s and 1970s, led republicanism to supplant liberalism, including 
social contract theory, as the supposed major influence on early American political and legal 
thought). 
13. Compare John DuM, The Politics of Locke in England and America in the Eighteenth 
Century, in JOHN LOCKE: PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES 45, 79 (John W. Yolton ed., 1969) 
(stating that Locke may have influenced colonialists, but only by "intellectual osmosis") and GARY 
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as sovereignty, 17 slavery, 1 8  alienage, 19 the negligence rule, 20 criminal 
incarceration, 21 Congressional nondelegation, 22 land use, 23 the law of 
finds/4 public health/5 self-incrimination, 26 civil forfeiture, 27 debt 
17. See Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907) ("Some doubts have been 
expressed as to the source of the immunity of a soveriegn power from suit without its permission, 
but the answer has been public property since before the days ofHobbes. (Leviathan, C. 26,2.)"); 
Occidental ofUmm al Qaywayn, Inc. v. A Certain Cargo ofPetroleum, 577 F.2d 1196, 1204 (5th 
Cir. 1978) ("In their external relations, sovereigns are bound by no law; they are like our ancestors 
before the recognition or imposition of the social contract."); Carl Marks & Co. v. USSR, 665 F. 
Supp. 323, 333 (S.D.N. Y. 1987) ("The classic expression of the doctrine of absolute immunity 
in our courts was offered, in language resonant of Thomas Hobbes by Chief Justice Marshall in 
The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 137, 3 L.Ed 287 (1812)."). 
18. See Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856); State v. Post, 20 N.J.L. 368 (1845) 
(blacks outside the social contract). 
19. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d, at 1231-33. Courts sometimes describe each nation 
of the world as having its own social contract. See, e.g. , Banco Nacionale de Cuba v. Chase 
Manhattan Bank, 505 F. Supp. 412,447 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff 'd in part, 658 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 
1981) (finding that a new social contract in a foreign nation does not give rise to claims for 
compensation for bad investments abroad). So, while aliens may be excluded from our social 
contract, they have the possibility of inclusion in their own. 
20. See Losee v. Buchannan, 51 N.Y. 476 (1873). 
21. See Baker v. Cuomo, 58 F.3d 814 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that New York statutes 
disenfranchising incarcerated felons were rationally related to social contract principles). Cf 
Imprisoned Citizens Union v. Sharp, 473 F. Supp. 1017, 1027 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (finding that 
prisoners' rights were supported by the social contract). 
22. See Bank One Chicago v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264 (1996) (stating that 
Locke was opposed to legislative delegation); United States v. Williams, 691 F. Supp. 36,44 n.5 
(M.D. Tenn. 1988) ("[T]he nondelegation doctrine is derived from the contractarian view that 
'laws derive their legitimacy from the consent of the governed and, in the American polity, the 
constitutional delegation of lawmaking power to the Congress establishes this consent."' (quoting 
Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 5 (1982)). 
23. Cf Sarasota County Anglers Club, Inc. v. Bums, 193 So. 2d 691, 693 (Fla. l st DCA 
1967) (stating "that the public interest demands that there be some impairment of the individual 
citizen's right to enjoy absolute freedom in the use of public" lands). 
24. Cf Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 US. 516, 526 n. l 9  ( 1982) ("right to appropriate a derelict 
. . .  existed in a state of nature"); Hener v. United States, 525 F. Supp. 350,353 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) 
(involving a dispute over rights to salvage silver from a sunken barge and stating that "[t]he 
common law of finds treats property that is abandoned as returned to the state of nature"). 
25. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 US. 11,27 (1905)(holding that state police powers 
extend to compulsory vaccinations and citing a phrase from the Massachusetts Constitution "that 
laid down as a fundamental principle of the social compact that the whole people covenants with 
each citizen, and each citizen with the whole people, that all shall be governed by certain laws for 
'the coll1ll1on good"'); cf Munn v. Illinois, 94 US. 113, 124 (1876) (finding that the state may 
regulate the maximum charges allowed for the storage of grain); Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of 
Los Angeles, 155 F. 554, 568-69 (C.C.S.D. Cal. 1907) (power to regulate telephone charges); City 
& County of Denver v. Denver & Rio Grande R.R., 167 P. 969,969-70 (Colo. 1917) (ordering 
removal of certain railroad tracks in town); Board of Barber Examiners v. Parker, 182 So. 485, 
504-05 (1938) (power to regulate barbers). 
26. See Phelps v. Duckworth, 772 F.2d 1410 (7th Cir. 1985) ("Even Thomas Hobbes, 
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collection, 28 and the right to privacj9 feature social contractarian rationales 
or rhetoric. Some of these opinions set major precedents. For example, the 
first American case to recognize a free-standing right to privacy did so on 
distinctly natural law and social contractarian grounds. 30 That judges have 
drawn upon the social contract tradition in their written opinions, has gone 
pretty much unexamined. In this lecture, I describe a broad selection of 
state and federal judges' most explicit uses of social contractarian 
philosophy. 31 
Social contractarian thought figures in American case law in  at l east 
three explicit ways, the first one less interesting than the others .  First, 
courts invoke the names and views of noted contractarian 
philosophers-Locke, Hobbes, Rousseau, and Rawls-as corroborating 
scholarly authority. Locke' s theory of government stressed individual rights 
against civil authority.32 Accordingly, judges cite Locke as scholarly 
authority for decisions that would limit the power of government i n  the 
interest of individual liberty or private property. 33 Judges have cited both 
staunch defender of authoritarian government" defended the right against self-incrimination.). 
27. See United States v. 785 St. Nicholas Ave., 983 F.2d 396, 402 (2d Cir. 1993) ("The true 
reason for permitting forfeiture, according to Blackstone, was that it is part of the price a citizen 
must pay for breaking the social contract by violating the law."). 
28. See Davis v. Richmond, 512 F.2d 201, 204-05 (1st Cir. 1975) (distraint of 1odger's 
property). 
29. See Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 69 (Ga. 1905). 
30. See id. ("The individual surrenders to society many rights and privileges which he would 
be free to exercise in a state of nature, in exchange for the benefits which he receives as a member 
of society."). 
31. What counted as an example of legal contractarianism for purposes of this study? I 
rejected as overly broad any judicial appeal to reason or the rational self as a limitation on 
government power or individual freedom. I adopted two criteria: (1) any judicial appeal in a 
published opinion to the need to accept government power or limitations on government power 
for the sake of a civilized or civil society, by reason of rational assent, contract, compact, or 
covenant; and (2) any express judicial use of the terms "social contract, compact, or covenant," 
"state of nature," or Locke, Hobbes, Rousseau and Rawls in a published opinion. The majority of 
the cases included in this paper are those meeting criteria (2 ), with a few meeting criterion (1 ). 
32. See People v. Walton, 383 N.E.2d 1000, 1002 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (citing Locke's 
Second Treatise on Government). 
33. Grandly describing "the importance of private property as a concomitant to liberty," a 
dissenting judge in United States v. $12,390, 956 F.2d 801, 810 (8th Cir. 1992) (Beam, J., 
dissenting) stated that "[t]he Fifth Amendment embodies the Lockean belief that liberty and the 
right to possess property are an interwoven whole." In an eminent domain case, Flan·da Rock 
Industn·es, Inc. v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct 160, 168 (1985), Judge Kozinski firmly stated that the 
court would not "free the United States of all constitutional constraints in the area of economic 
regulation." Kozinski went on to quote libertarian Professor Richard Epstein: "Our guiding 
principle should derive from our Lockean tradition-a tradition that speaks about justice and 
natural rights." !d. at 168-69 (quoting Richard Epstein, Judicial Review: Reckoning on Two Kinds 
of Errors, 4 CATO J. 711, 716 (1985); see also Garner v. United States, 501 F.2d 228, 245 (9th 
Cir. 1972) (Koelsch, J., dissenting) ("Concern for the accusatorial system is a concern for the 
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Locke and Hobbes as venerated support for the Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination.34 Notwithstanding the civil libertarian 
understanding of the right against self-incrimination defended in his 
Leviathan, Hobbes argued for a near absolute form of sovereign  
government over the individual. 35 From time to  time judges cite Hobbes 
with plain disapproval as a paradigm of illiberal political extremism. 36 
Judges seeking warrant for extending government power or granting 
governmental immunities have cited Hobbes with approval . 37 Rousseau ' s  
preservation of individual privacy as wel l ,  reflecting the Lockean notion that government is 
essentially a restraint on liberty and ought to leave the individual alone . ");  In re C incinnati 
Radiation Litig. , 874 F. Supp. 796, 8 1 5  (S .D.  Ohio 1 99 5 )  ("John Locke, the ideological father of 
the American Revolution," asserted that "[t]he function of the law . . .  [is] to protect individual 
l iberty from restraint by government or others."); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v.  FTC, 
7 1 0  F.2d 1 1 65,  1 1 77 n.6 (6th Cir. 1 983) (stating that Locke called for rules of law desig.11.ed to 
protect against arbitrary government). 
34.  See Garner, 5 0 1  F.2d at 245 (Koelsch, J . ,  dissenting). In Gamer, Judge Koelsch argued 
in his dissent that Lockean ideas of government protect an individual's right to invoke the Fifth 
Amendment. Courts cite Hobbes, along with Locke, in support of the constitutional right against 
compulsory self-incrimination: 
A covenant to accuse oneself, without assurance of pardon, is likewise invalid. 
For in the condition of nature, where every man is  judge, there is no place for 
accusation; and in the civil state the accusation is fol lowed with punishment, 
which, being force, a man is not obliged not to resist. 
Communist Party of the United States v.  Subversive Activities Control Bd. ,  367 U . S .  1 ,  1 80 
( 1 96 1 )  (quoting HOBBES, supra note 2, at 1 1 0- 1 1 ). Justice William 0. Douglas chose to quote at 
length the distinctly contractarian rational for the prohibition against compulsory self­
incrimination. See id. In a dissenting opinion by Justice Douglas i n  Communist Parry he made the 
case for a strict application of the Fifth Amendment prohibition against self-incrimination on 
behalf of members of the Communist party. See id. Douglas quipped that "even as ardent an 
advocate of the totalitarian state as Thomas Hobbes respected this core of privacy ."  Id. Phelps v. 
Duckworth, 772 F.2d 1 4 1 0  (7th Cir. 1 985), is another example of the "even Hobbes" rhetorical 
move, in association with a liberal defense of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self­
incrimination. In Phelps, Judge Cummings alludes to the "centuries old" principle, asserting that 
"[ e ]ven Thomas Hobbes, staunch defender of authoritarian government though he was, \vTote that 
. . .  'no man can be obliged by covenant to accuse himself."' !d. at 1 4 1 7  (quoting HOBBES , supra 
note 2, at 1 1  0).  
3 5 .  See HoBBES, supra note 2 ,  at 1 32;  cf United States v .  Cox, 342 F.2d 1 67,  1 93 n . 1 9  (5th 
C ir. 1 96 5 )  (citing proposition that "Hobbes told us long ago, and everybody now lmderstands that 
there must be a supreme authority, a conclusive power, in every state on every point somewhere. "  
(quoting WALTER BAGEHOT, THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION 248 ( 1 872)) ). 
36. See, e.g., Times Film Corp. v.  C ity of Chicago, 365 U.S .  43, 79 ( 1 96 1 )  (Douglas, J . ,  
dissenting) ("Hobbes was the censor' s  proponent."); Phelps, 772 F .2d 1 4 1 7; cf Communist Party, 
367 U.S .  at 1 80 (Douglas, J . ,  dissenting) ("Even as ardent an advocate of the totalitarian state as 
Thomas Hobbes respected this core of privacy."). But see Christensen v. Valentine, 122 F.2d 5 1 1 ,  
523 (2d C ir.  1 94 1 )  ("Hobbes . . .  perhaps erroneously [is] regarded as an extreme absolutist"). 
37. Thus one court cited Hobbes' rule of law warning that: "For as long as every man 
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views about the role of the public in rearing and educating children were 
contrasted with the contemporary U. S .  view favoring private child rearing 
in Franz v. United States. 38 In another court of appeals case, the judge 
again mentioned Rousseau in relation to the dilemma of introducing public 
law into the private sector. 39 The name of John Rawls, the leading 
contractarian political theorist of our times, appears more than a dozen 
times. Rawls is cited, for example, in a dissenting opinion in a torts case in  
which the judge adopted Rawls' s methodology of reasoning about justice 
from the original position.40 Rawls' s overall influence on case law may be 
more subtle .  One detects a slight increase in the number of cases employing 
generic, overt social contractarian references in the decades following the 
publication of A Theory of Justice41 than in the immediately prior few 
holdeth this Right of doing anything he liketh, so long are men in the condition of War." 
Christensen, 122 F.2d at 523 (quoting HOBBES, supra note 2). Hobbes's view that the powers of 
sovereigns are absolute and indivisible make his Leviathan an apt cite, as in United States v. Cox, 
342 F.2d at 193 & n.19, a case concerning the discretionary prosecutorial powers of the United 
States through its Attorney General. 
38. 707 F.2d 582, 599 n.72 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
39. See Brockway Motor Trucks v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 720, 722 (3d Cir. 1978) (citing 
Rousseau, Selnick, Judith Sklar and Roberto Unger). Judge Adams commenced a labor relations 
case with an unusually philosophical statement of the difficulty of reconciling "ideals of public 
law" and responsibility with "norms of private right and individualism, fundamental to our 
society." Id. 
40. See Barnes v. Tools & Machinery Builders, Inc., 715 S.W.2d 518, 523-24 (Mo. 1986) 
(Donnelly, J., dissenting). This heavy-handed importation of the Theory of Justice to the common 
law was an attempt to resolve with fairness the issue of liability in a negligence action. See id. at 
524. 
Judges have cited Rawls in more than a dozen other cases. His version of social contract theory 
is recognized in the majority opinion in Davis v. Fulton County, 884 F .  Supp. 1245, 1254 (E. D. 
Ark. 1995), a;J'd, 90 F.3d 1346 (8th Cir. 1996) (private sphere limits public responsibility); In 
reJointEastem and SouthemDistrict Asbestos Litigation, 878 F. Supp. 473, 561 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 
1995), aff'd, 100 F.3d 944 (2d Cir.), aff 'd, 100 F.3d 945 (2d Cir. 1996), aff'd in part, vacated in 
part, 78 F.3d 764 (2d Cir. 1996) (contractual basis for society); McAdoo v. Diaz, 884 P.2d 1385, 
1390 (Aiaska 1994) (altruism possible); Runway 27 Coalition, Inc. v. Ergen, 679 F. Supp. 95, 
105 (D Mass. 1987) (limits of public authority)� Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 652 F.2d 
278, 285 (2d Cir. 1981 );lvlemphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc. , Inc., 616 F.2d 956, 958 (6th Cir. 
1980) (desire for good will of others); Repetti v. Gil, 372 N.Y.S.2d 840, 848 (Sup. Ct. 1975) 
(liberty is first principle of justice); Auld v. Estridge, 382 N.Y.S.2d 897, 904 (Sup. Ct.1976), 
aff'd, 395 N. Y.S.2d 969 (App. Div. 1977) (justice is fairness); and K-Mart v. Ponsock, 732 P.2d 
1364, 1368 (Nev. 1987). Rawls is cited in a concurring opinion in Goetz v. Crosson, 967 F.2d 29, 
30 (2d Cir. 1992) (Newman, J., concurring) (veil of ignorance) and United States v. Lucas, 2 M.J. 
834, 838 (A.C.M.R. 1975) (control of individual conduct). Finally, Rawls is cited in a dissenting 
opinion in Western Addition Community Org. v. NLRB, 485 F.2d 917, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1973), rev 'd 
sub nom, Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org. , 420 U.S. 50 (1975) 
(requirements of justice); Jensen v. ARA Servs., Inc. , 736 S.W.2d 374 (Mo. 1987) (justice as 
fairness); and People v. Julliet, 475 N.W.2d 786,810 (Mich. 1991) (reflective equilibrium). 
41. RAWLS, supra note 4. 
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decades. 
Invocations to the social contract tradition occur in passing as rhetorical 
flourishes, adding little more than a thin luster of literacy to a j udge's 
prose . 42 Sometimes, they run deeper. 43 Indeed, there is more to social 
contractarianism in the case law than explicit mentions-in-passing of the 
names of famous philosophers . As described below in Part I, judges have 
relied on the social contractarian idea of the state of nature as a principle 
of decision.  Social con tractarians use the term "the state of nature" as the 
imagined original condition of pre-civi l  society, and the condition into 
which human society would devolve without effective government. In some 
instances, judges link the term "state of nature" to specific philosophers or 
political theori sts .  But in other instances, judges use the term without 
mentioning its philosophic roots. "State of nature" has come to have 
several distinguishable jurisprudential meanings in the case law, only one 
of which is "natural state."44 
Like "state of nature," the expression "social contract" has multiple 
meanings in the law. As elaborated below in Part II, in dozens of instances, 
and for a variety of purposes since the late eighteenth century, judges have 
made explicit mention of the idea of the "social contract" or "social 
compact" in the course of articulating majority, concurring, or dissenting 
opinions. Judges mention the social contract both with approval, as part of 
efforts to justify a particular conclusion of law, and with disapproval to 
condemn what they mean to present as archaic thinking. 45 Of particular 
4 2. See. e.g., Justice v. Elrod, 83 2 F.2d 1048 (7th Cir. 1987) (" Yet apart from a vague and 
legally ungrounded invocation of a supposed pre-constitutional right to bear arms-a Hobbesian 
right of self-defense in the state of nature .... ");Archie v. City of Racine, 8 26 F.2d 480, 486-87 
(7th Cir. 1987) ("We hasten to add that our recognition of the non justiciability of these issues is 
not acquiescence in a Hobbesian state of nature where criminals or madmen terrorize others with 
impunity."); United States v. Cangiano, 491 F. 2d 906, 915 n.2 ( 2d Cir. 1974) (Oakes, J., 
dissenting) ("[l]n a true state of nature-zoological or otherwise--obscenity would not exist; it 
is, as the philosopher Berkeley would have said, only because it is perceived in the eye of the 
viewer."). Judge Irving Younger began one of his opinions: "Perhaps chief among the assurances 
which together make up the social contract is the judiciary's promise never to close the courthouse 
doors." 500 West 174 St. v. Vasquez, 3 25 N.Y.S.2d 256,257 (Civ. Ct. 1971); see also Johnson 
v. Pataki, 655 N.Y.S. 2d 463, 467 (App. Div. 1997) ("They have no greater identifiable 'right' 
to a district attorney who universally renounces the death penalty than any other group of voters 
would have to a governor who embraces their own particular vision of Mr. Thomas Hobbes' [sic] 
Social Contract."). 
43. See Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 69 (1905). 
44. The phrases "natural" and "natural state" are not strong signs of social contractarianism; 
but "state of nature" is, particularly when used to refer to something other than an actual natural 
state of a person or thing. In a case alleging that the foul odor emanating from a calf-feeding 
facility violated the Clean Air Act, the court cited an earlier court's definition of "natural"; one 
of 15 meanings of natural in the 1934 Webster's Dictionary was "state of nature." See State v. FIR 
Cattle Co., 8 28 S.W.2d 303, 305 (Tex. App. 199 2). 
45. Judge Mikva, in dissent, dismissed "state of nature" based rationales as "antediluvian" 
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interest are cases in which courts use the concept of a social contract with 
implicit or explicit approval as part of a serious-seeming effort to justify a 
legal result. 
A Methods and Assumptions 
The computer greatly improves a scholar' s ability to survey case law 
efficiently and to provide factual answers to specific questions about the 
social contractarian dimensions of case law. 46 How often, and in what eras, 
have courts explicitly invoked the social contract tradition in published 
cases? In what kinds of cases, and for what purposes, have judges adduced 
the idea of the social contract? Which judges have most frequently cited 
social contractarian ideas? Does contractarian thought appear more often 
in majority and concurring opinions, or in dissenting opinions? Which 
philosophers ' versions of the social contract have judges most commonly 
cited, and for what purposes? Fairly good answers to these questions are 
available and worth having. My traditional and electronic search uncovered 
numerous instances ofjudges mentioning or using social contract theory in 
1 8th, 1 9th, and 20th century published case opinions. 
I uncovered fewer instances of distinctly social contractarian language 
and thought than I had anticipated . The currency of the idea of the social 
contract in popular culture47 and academic scholarship,48 combined with the 
thought. Washington Water Power Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 775 F.2d 305,338 
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (Mikva, J . ,  dissenting). 
46. This is a computer-assisted study. I employed an on-line computer service to identify 
cases containing specific contractarian tem1inology and the names of specific contractarian 
philosophers. I employed search tenns, including "social contract," "social compact," "covenant," 
"state of nature," "Hobbes," "Rousseau," "Rawls," "Kant," and "Locke." Search terms and 
potential search terms such as "Locke" and "civilized society" posed problems of over­
inclusiveness. I also used computers to create a data-base for sorting cases by date and subject 
matter. I am grateful for the help of research assistants Norma Schrock, Thaddeus Pope, Michael 
Seidl, and Erin Kidwell. 
4 7. The popular vitality of the modem idea of the social contract is in evidence in the realms 
of public law. It was in evidence in 1994 when the Republicans in Congress signed what they 
termed a "Contract with America," exploiting the pervasive habit of conceiving good and 
legitimate government as the product of political bargains. Cf Kery Murakami, Suit Claims GOP 
Stole Idea for 'Contract ': Washington Man Wants Credit for Inventing Campaign Tactic, WASH. 
PosT, July 6, 1996, at A l 3  (describing Newt Gingrich-led Contract with America and similar 
pledges by another politician). 
The idea was in evidence in 1995 when Congressional Telecommunications Sub-Committee 
chair Ed Markey said he wanted "to reinvigorate the social compact between broadcasters and the 
American people." Kim McAvoy,Markey Lays out Legislative Agenda, BROADCASTING&CABLE, 
Oct. 10, 1994, at 22, 22. An attorney's materials for a recent continuing legal education course 
introduced a "social contract interpretation of the power of eminent domain." Gavin M.  Erasmus, 
Eminent Domain Jurisprudence, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY, Jan. 7, 1994, at 1 & 3. 
48. Numerous scholars have studied social contract thought and incorporated social 
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broad claims some historians and philosophers make about the significance 
of the social contract tradition to America' s founding and Constitution, 49 
led me to expect to uncover a couple of thousand, rather than a couple of 
hundred relevant cases making express use of the "social contract . "  I 
uncovered fewer instances of distinctly social contractarian l anguage and 
thought than anticipated. Of course, not all American judicial opinions are 
available through on-line services. Ar1d subtle manifestations of social 
contractarianism in case law elude mechanical discovery. The opinion of the 
New York Court of Appeals in the definitive negligence case Losee v. 
Buchanan50 includes an argument to the effect that we are surely willing to 
surrender the freedom to demand compensation for blameless accidental 
injury in exchange for the conveniences of a civilized industrial society. The 
court 's  argument strongly suggests the social contractarian tradition, but 
without specific mention of the name of a contractarian philosopher. The 
same is true of State v. Post, 5 1 in which the court invoked consensualism 
and reciprocity in defense of a gradual approach to ending slavery. 52 
In designing my search I distinguished between contract theory and 
social contract theory. Ideals of contract flourished in Western thought in  
one form or  another before the full flowering of social contract theory. To 
be sure, liberal social contract theorists have tended to emphasize the 
importance of freedom of contract, along with property rights. 53 But i n  
American law, judicial appeal to principles of free contract are not, ipso 
facto, appeals to social contract theory. Owen Fiss might disagree. He 
discerns quite a bit more social contractarianism in case law than I do . 54 
Eben Moglen got it right when he criticized Fiss for interpreting as an 
contractarian thinking in their work. See generally DAVID GAUTHIER, MoRAL DEAUNG: 
CONTRACT, ETHJCS, Al\'D REASON ( 1 990) (hereinafter MORAL DEAUNG);  DAVID GAUTHIER, 
MORALS BY AGREEMENT ( 1986 ); JEAN HAMPTON, HOBBES AND TilE SOCIAL CONTRACT TRADffiON 
( 1 986); DAVID AJ. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND TilE CONSTITUTION ( 1 986); cf CHARLES W. 
MILLs, THE RACIAL CONTRACT ( 1 997); BRIAN SKYR11.1S, EVOLUTION OF TilE SOCIAL Cut-..!RACT 
( 1 997). 
49. See sources cited supra notes 5 -15. 
50. 51 N.Y. 476 ( 1 873) (imposing liability for injuries caused by an exploding boiler 
depending upon whether defendant acted negligently). 
5 1 .  20 N.J.L 368 ( 1 845). 
52. See id. at 386. 
53.  See Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 8 1 5  F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1 987) ("[T]he fundamental 
function of contract law (and recognized as such at least since Hobbes's day) is to deter people 
from behaving opportunistically toward their contracting parties . . . .  " (quoting RrCHA.'ill A 
POSNER, ECONOMlC ANALYSIS OF LAW 8 1  (3d ed. 1 986))); James Boyle, Legal Realism and the 
Social Contract: Fuller 's Public Jun·sprudence ofFonn, Private Jurisprudence of Substance, 78 
CoRJ-..'ELL L REv. 371 ,  387-88 & n.72 ( 1 993) (noting that both social contract and legal contract 
theory emphasize freedom and "respect for private property"). 
54. See OWEN M. FISS, 8 TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1 888-1 9 1 0, at 15 9 
(1993). 
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instance of social contractarianism just about any example of a judge 
grappling with i ssues of freedom from government restraint. 55 For purposes 
of this study, I did not treat stand-alone legal contractualism as evidence of 
post-Revolutionary era uses of social contract theory in law. One would 
find an overwhelming abundance of social contractarianism in the case law 
if one attributed to social contract theory all glorification of the idea of 
binding private agreement and freedom from restraint. 
B. Purposes 
My central purposes in examining the significant post-Revolutionary 
uses of the social contract tradition are to i solate and to put into 
perspective, social contractarianism as a potentially problematic form of 
judicial doctrine and figurative legal rhetoric. 56 The fiction of the social 
contract evolving from a state of nature57 has powerful meaning in 
American culture. Attractive and entrenched, social contractarianism has 
utility for judicial opinion-writing. Judges required to justify their decisions 
in written opinions can capitalize on the flexibility and broad appeal of 
social contract theory. 
The potentially problematic character of social contractarianism in law 
derives precisely from the cultural status of social contract theory as a 
source of an especially seductive, malleable fiction. In the past, judges' 
reliance on social contractarianism led courts to provide palatable but 
superficial rationales for decisions that may have been genuinely 
controversial . Moreover, judges ' reliance on social contractarianism has 
served the interests of injustice--even extremes of injustice. Past errors of 
inadequate rationalization and injustice are easily repeated, so long as the 
myths and metaphors of social contract theory retain force. 
As myth, social contractarian thought functions to enlarge judicial 
attributions of legal obligation beyond the realm of mere compulsion and 
55 .  See Eben Moglen, Holmes 's Legacy and the New Constitutional History, 1 0 8  HARv. L .  
REv. 2027, 2033-34, 2038-39 ( 1 995) (reviewing Fiss, supra note 54). 
56.  See L.H. LARUE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AS FICTION: NARRATIVE IN TIIE RHETORIC OF 
AUTHORITY ( 1 995). The study of legal metaphor is not uncommon. See HAIG A.  BosMAnAN, 
METAPHOR AND REASON IN JUDICIAL OPINIONS ( 1 992); Jan G. Deutsch, Law as Metaphor: A 
Structural Analysis of Legal Process, 66 GEO. L .J . 1 339  ( 1 978); Burr Henly, "Penumbra " The 
Roots of a Legal Metaphor, 1 5  HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 8 1  ( 1 987); Thomas Ross, Metaphor and 
Paradox, 23 GA. L. REv. 1 053 ( 1 989); Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the 
Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN . L. REv. 1 37 1  ( 1 988); Steven L. Winter, Transcendental 
Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning, and the Cognitive Stakes for Law, 1 37 U. PA. L .  REv. 1 1 05, 
1 1 59-7 1  ( 1 989) .  I do not attempt in this article to answer all  the worthy questions one might ask 
and answer about the social contract legacy in American law in the computer age. 
57. See Edwards v. Leopoldi, 89 A.2d 264, 267 (N.J .  Super. Ct. App. Div. 1 952) 
(acknowledging perspective that "social contract" is a legal fiction); cf LA WRENCE M. SOLAN, THE 
LANGUAGE OF JUDGES ( 1 993) .  
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competing interests. Roland Barthes' s  account of mythology suggests that 
"myth has the task of giving an historical intention a natural justification, 
and making contingency appear eternal . "58 This same account suggests that 
"myth is depoliticized speech" that gives things "a natural and eternal 
justification."59 Literal law can be politically raw; naming our actual 
predicament can diminish us. Mythic law enlarges us with stories of agency 
and purpose. Myth-making, like other modes oflegal fiction, is a useful but 
dangerous dimension of judicial law. 60 In its mythic dimension, the social 
contract invites us to see our rights and duties as more than merely human 
or local conventions, even though they are recognizably at least that .  The 
state of nature and the social contract unite in a myth that invites us to see 
our practices and the society that they constitute as justified and just by 
virtue of inevitable rational choices made against a background of risk and 
violence not of our own creation. Urging realism in law, Justice Hugo 
Black suggested that the social contract, natural law and other "great 
juristic myths of history"61 are best shelved . 
As metaphor, social contract rhetoric is a vehicle for moving language 
beyond the limitations of literal speech. Metaphorical speech shapes how 
we view reality; indeed, what we regard as reality. Metaphor can hide what 
is unpleasant and unwanted, and focus attention on what is p leasant and 
wanted. 62 The metaphorical transformation of reality has important 
consequences for conduct in the practical realm where metaphors become 
"a license for policy change and political and economic action."63 
Metaphors and other judicial tropes should be identified and understood, 
since their acceptance or rejection "will determine the legal principles and 
doctrines by which we will be guided and ruled. "64 
The judicial opinion has many functions :  i t  teaches, it explains, it 
exhorts, it compels. Strictly literal rationales for legal decisions would 
require judges and the general public to confront law in its coercive and 
contingent aspect as an instrument of power and pragmatism. Literal law 
can be frightening. The idea of a social contract forged out of natural chaos 
and competition has functioned to cushion, though not fully disguise, the 
58 .  ROLAND BARTI-IES, MYTIIOLOGIES 1 42 (Annette Lavers trans. ,  1 972). 
59. !d. 
60. See LON FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS ( 1 967). 
6 1 .  Federal Power Comm'n v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. , 3 1 5  U.S. 575, 605 n .6  ( 1 94 1 )  
(Black, Douglas, & Murphy, J.J.  concurring). 
62. See GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY 1 0- 1 3  ( 1 980) .  In 
Brophy v .  New England Sinai Hosp . ,  Inc . ,  497 N.E.2d 626, 64 1 n . 1 (Mass. 1 986) (Lynch, J. , 
dissenting), the dissenting judge shifted focus from the grim realities of a comatose, helpless l ife 
in a persistent vegetative state by appeal to the idea of the social contract empowering us and 
compelling the state to respect the "sanctity of life." 
63. LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 62, at 1 56 .  
64 . BosMAJIAN, supra note 56 ,  a t  205.  
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coercive dimensions of law. According to David Gauthier, " [t]he 
contractarian brings good news-there is a touchstone for moral practices 
and political institutions."65 Judges evoke the idea ofthe social contract to 
package as good news what is bound to be received as bad news to losing 
litigants. The contractarian judge locates morality and justice, not in feeling, 
fixed duties, or utility, but "in the intelligent ordering of our mutual affairs 
in ways that benefit each, and so are rationally acceptable to each. "66 The 
litigant who loses in the resolution of a particular dispute nonetheless wins 
as a "potential partner in ' a  cooperative venture for mutual advantage. "' 67 
In its metaphoric dimension, the social contract converts positive law into 
gospel . 
Invoking the key elements of social contract theory-the state of nature 
and the social contract-masks judicial and other governmental coercion 
in a cloak of consensualism and rational self-interest . Pointing this  out is 
not a condemnation of social contractarianism in law. There are often good 
reasons to present the literal truth of inevitable coercion in metaphor. 
Appeal to a social contract can foster the spirit of cooperation and 
compromise. Yet, there are sometimes good reasons not to conceal truth 
in metaphor. 
An elderly woman is working alone in a store across the street from a 
county jail .  Exploiting his status as a trustee, a pretrial detainee with a 
history of assaulting senior citizens, escapes and brutally rapes and beats 
the shopkeeper . The federal district court hearing motions i n  the 
subsequent civil action brought by the woman and her spouse is drawn to 
the logic of DeShaney v. Winnebago County:68 the public sector is not 
liable for private misconduct. 69 The judge cites DeShaney, but also cites 
John Rawls and the social contract tradition. 70 But, the contractarian' s  
argument that the powers and duties o f  government are justly limited by 
conditions of rational consent does not explain the holding ofDeShaney or 
why the woman's  injuries in this case should go uncompensated. The 
explanation could be that the injury was foreseeable and the shopkeeper 
was the cheapest cost avoider; or that the public sector' s  financial resources 
are limited and better allocated to other purposes; or that the potential for 
a flood of litigation is too great . Liberal social contract theory ' s  generic 
preserve of a private sphere does not dictate the level of care owed citizens 
by the state. 
65 .  GAliTHIER, MoRAL DEALING, supra note 48,  at  1 .  
66. !d. at 2 .  
67. !d. (quoting John Rawls). 
68 .  489 U.S .  1 89 ( 1 989). 
69.  See Davis v. Fulton County, 884 F. Supp. 1 245 (E.D. Ark. 1 995), ajJ'd, 90 F . 3d 1 346 
(8th Cir. 1 996). 
70. See id. 
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Judges err when, exploiting myths and metaphors derived from social 
contract theory, they present controversial outcomes as required by natural 
order and rational pact. Their error is not merely the error of heavy-handed 
fiction and formalism in a post-realist age, an age less tolerant of 
"transcendental nonsense"71 than past ages. The error is potentially one of 
simple injustice and immorality. Contractarian arguments were employed 
by the Antebellum courts to justify slavery and political exclusion. Social 
contract rationalizations "validated" slavery by characterizing blacks as 
outside of the American social contract 72 or as parties to a social contract 
under which they consented to bondage in exchange for protection.73 These 
7 1 .  See Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 36 C OLUM. 
L. REv. 809 ( 1 935) .  
72. See Pendleton v.  State, 6 Ark. 509 ( 1 846); Jackson v. Bulloch, 12  Conn. 3 8  ( 1 8 37); cf 
Vance v. Crawford, 4 Ga. 445 ,  4 5 9  ( 1 848); Mitchell v. Wells, 37 Miss. 2 3 5 ,  250 ( 1 8 5 9); 
Anderson v. Poindexter, 6 Oh. 623 ( 1 856); WENDElL PHilLIPS, THE CONSTITUTION: A PRo­
SLAVERY Co:tvfPACT ( 1 856).  The Supreme Court applied a kind of social contract thinking to the 
question of black citizenship in the infamous case of Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S ( 1 9  How.) 3 9 3  
( 1 856), in which Justice Taney argued that slaveholding states would not have agreed to the 
Constitution if they had thought the word "citizens" included free blacks. See DoN E. 
FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE 355 ( 1 978) ;  Hans W. Baade, "On"ginal Intent "  in 
Historical Perspective: Some Critical Glosses, 69 TEX . L. REv. 1 00 1 ,  1 054-5 5 ( 1 99 1  ); Gerald L. 
Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 1 00 YALE L.J. 909, 940 ( 1 99 1 ). 
7 3 .  See State v. Post, 20 N.J.L 368 ( 1 845) .  Locke held both that no man can by compact 
enslave himself to anyone and that negro slaves were justifiably enslaved as captives of a just war; 
Blackstone agreed with the former point, but not the latter. See THE SovEREIGNTY OF TIIE LAw 
1 1 5  ( Gareth Jones ed., 1 973); Robert Garson, Pros/avery as Political Theory: The Examples of 
John C. Calhoun and George Fitzhugh, 84 S. ATLANTIC Q. 1 97, 200-0 1 ( 1 9 8 5 ). Anthony R. 
Chase, Race, Culture, and Contract Law: From the Cottonfield to the Courtroom, 2 8  CoNN. L. 
REv. 1 ,  1 4- 1 5  ( 1 995)  (finding religious paternalism as a justification for slavery and Lockean 
natural law as a threat to slavery); Jonas Bernstein, New Study Sweeps Arab Slaving Out from 
Under the Carpet, WASH. TIMES , July 3 ,  1 989, at D7 (finding a paternalistic contractarian 
justification for slavery in Arab culture). 
Some courts argued that slaves were actually benefitted by Lheir "consent" to bondage. See The 
Antelope, 23 U.S. ( 1 0  Wheat.) 66, 1 2 1  ( 1 82 5 )  (holding that slavery was founded on captivity in 
war, which was a "legitimate result of force"); Hervy v. Armstrong, 1 5  Ark. 1 62,  1 6 9  ( 1 854) 
("The elevation of the white race, and the happiness of the slave, vitally depend upon maintaining 
the ascendancy of one and the submission of the other."); Pendleton v. State, 6 Ark. 509, 5 1 2 
( 1 846) ("The two races, differing as they do in complexion, habits, conformations, and intellectual 
endowments, could not nor ever will live together upon tenns of social or political equality."); 
American Colonization Soc'y  v. Gartrell, 23 Ga. 448, 464 ( 1 857) (Liberia is filled with "[a] few 
thousand thriftless, lazy semi-savages, dying of famine, because they will not work' To inculcate 
care and industry upon the descendants of Ham, is to preach to the idle winds."); Collins v .  
Huchins, 21 Ga. 270,  274 ( 1 857) ("A negro . . .  [has] the power of thought and volition . . . but 
does not generally have judgment to direct him in what is proper for him, or prudence and self­
denial to restrain him from use of what is injurious."); Bryan v. Walton, 1 4  Ga. 1 85 ,  205-06 
( 1 85 3 )  (" [T]he slave who receives the care and protection of a tolerable master, is superior in 
comfort to the free negro."); Gorman v. Campbell, 14  Ga. 1 37, 143 ( 1 85 3 )  ("We must . . .  [make] 
it the interest of all who employ slaves, to watch over their lives and safety. Their improvidence 
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uses of the social contract metaphor are objectionable and degrading74 
because ofwhat they hide and repress.75 It is surely wrong to make people 
complacent about the institution of human chattel slavery through the use 
of a persuasive metaphor of consent and self-interest. As they enlarge and 
comfort humanity, some social contractarian myths and metaphors "can 
lead to distortion and inhumanity. "76 
Judges go wrong, too, when they purport to derive outcomes from 
"axiomatic arguments about the ' state of nature. "'77 A survey of the many 
uses the courts make of the expression "state of nature" reveals quite 
clearly that "nature" in law extends to objects and states of affairs 
permeated with human artifice--an urban park, a violent prison cell­
block,78 and an abandoned jar of money dug up at a construction site.79 
What judges mean by "nature" shifts from one context to another, as they 
struggle to justify their assignments of entitlement. There are many good 
economic reasons to limit municipal liability for accidental injuries on public 
roadways. Yet, capricious injustice, rather than justice or rational public 
policy otherwise conceived, is suggested by a holding that denies recovery 
to an injured jogger on the median-strip or shoulder of the road, because 
it is deemed in a "state of nature."  
Lon Fuller observed that getting rid of old legal fictions may simply 
invite new legal fictions, no less worrisome. 80 I remain agnostic about 
whether, all things considered, social contractarian arguments merit a place 
in case law' s justificatory tool-box. 81 I am certain, however, that the public 
demands it. They are incapable of self-preservation, either in danger or in disease."); Neal v. 
Farmer, 9 Ga. 555 , 582 ( 1 85 1 ); Vance v. Crawford, 4 Ga. 445 , 459 ( 1 848)  ("[W]e concede that 
the condition of our slaves is humble, still it is infinitely better than it would have been, but for 
this very system of bondage, better than the lower orders of Europe, and better far that it would 
be, if they were emancipated here. "); Peter v. Hargrave, 46 Va. (5 Gratt. ) 12,  1 9  ( 1 848); Spencer 
v. Pilcher, 3 5  Va. (8 Leigh) 565, 584 ( 1 837). 
74 . See Lakoff & Johnson, supra note 62, at 236. 
75 .  See Ev AFEDERKrrr AY , METAPHOR: ITS COGNITIVE FORCE AND LINGUISTIC STRUCTURE 
103  ( 1 989). 
76. BosMAJIAN, supra note 56, at 42; see also Henly, supra note 56, at 8 1  (stating that legal 
metaphors intended to liberate thought often end up enslaving thought) (quoting Berkey v. Third 
Ave. Ry. ,  1 5 5  N.E. 58, 6 1  ( 1 926)). 
77. Stevens v .  Tillman, 855 F.2d 394, 399 (7th Cir. 1 988) .  
78.  See Farmer v. Brennan, 5 1 1 U.S.  825, 833  ( 1 994). 
79.  See Couch v .  Schley, 272 S .W.2d 1 7 1 ,  173  (Tex. Civ. App. 1 954) (stating that "$ 1 000 
in currency found while working on another's land belong[s] , as in a state of nature, to the first 
occupant or fortunate finder"). 
80 . •  See FULLER, supra note 60, at 17 ("Eliminating the ' fiction' from law often means only 
substituting dead metaphors for live ones."). 
8 1 .  See Anita L. Allen, Taking Liberties: Privacy, Private Choice, and Social Contract 
Theory, 56 U. CINN. L. REv. 461  ( 1 987) (suggesting social contract arguments are heuristic 
devices for enlarging normative understanding). 
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should scrutinize figurative social contractarian rationales when they appear 
in decisions with broad and controversial impact. My hope i s  that this brief 
examination of the term "state of nature" and the "social contract" in  case 
law will go a little ways toward making judicial opinion-writers more 
circumspect about reliance on social contractarian rationales, and the public 
more circumspect about easy acceptance. 
II. THE STATE OF NATURE 
In social contract theory, the state of nature is the antecedent of social 
contract and civil society. States of nature figure prominently in social 
contract theory, seldom as peaceable kingdoms, most often as conditions 
of unmatched peril . The social contract theory ofThomas Hobbes posits a 
condition of natural freedom and risk prior to the formation of civil 
society. 82 Although individuals are free in the state of nature, their freedom 
is obtained without reliable protection. Life is famously "solitary, poor, 
nasty, brutish, and short. "83 Rational individuals join with others in the 
social contract for enhanced freedom and security. In defense of the rule of 
law, one court observed that the social contract creates the rule oflaw, and 
thereby allows society to benefit from the rejection of the state of nature. 84 
Neither Hobbes nor Locke strictly believed in the existence of the state of 
nature as a historical event . The state of nature is a fiction. Hobbes did, 
however, point to pre-Columbian North America as an example of the 
savage condition of uncivilized natural man that England had done well to 
escape centuries earlier. 85 As noted by the Missouri judge who used John 
Rawls' s The Theory of Justice as an unlikely framework for crafting a 
dissenting opinion in a products liability case, "the original position of 
equality corresponds to the state of nature in the traditional theory of the 
social contract."86 The original position is indeed a parallel fiction. Rawls 
explicates the original position as a heuristic for normative reflection about 
the requirements of justice and fairness. 
The expression "state of nature" has had an interesting and varied life 
in the law. It appears literally thousands of times in published opinions. 
Specific legal doctrines and their applications rely on the distinction 
between those people and things that exist in a state of nature and those 
that do not. Judges employ the term "state of nature" to denote one of four 
things : (a) the placement or condition of environmental attributes-such as 
82. See HOBBES, supra note 2,  at 1 00-02. 
8 3 .  !d. at 1 00. 
84. See Hester v.  City of Milledgeville, 598 F. Supp. 1456,  1 473 (M.D. Ga. 1 984). 
8 5 .  See HOBBES, supra note 2. 
86.  Barnes v.  Tools & Machinery Builders, Inc. ,  7 1 5  S.W.2d 5 1 8 , 523 (Mo. 1 986) 
(Dmmelly, J . ,  dissenting) (quoting RAWLS, supra note 4, at 1 1 - 1 2). 
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parklands, 87 unchanneled waterways, 88 untamed wildlife, 89 unrnined 
minerals,90 unoccupied fields or forests;91 (b) artificial or natural realms that 
expose human beings to foreseeably high risks of physical injury-such as 
unguarded beaches,92 and poorly managed prisons;93 (c) benign states of 
human freedom or self-sovereignty-such as the state of freedom-to­
contract enjoyed by prospective employees who may accept or rej ect 
proffered terms of employment, or composers who may negotiate or forego 
fees from prospective music users;94 and (d) the status ofunowned, lost or 
abandoned personality, realty, or other things deemed available for 
appropriation and ownership. 95 What the courts say exists in  a state of 
nature and what they say does not can be surprising. Nature is not always 
natural in the case law. 
87. Laird v. City of Pittsburgh, 54 A 324 (Pa. 1 903) ("No doubt the idea of open air and 
space, with the land kept in grass and trees, as if approximately in the state of nature, still inheres 
in the general understanding of the word [park] . . . .  "). 
88 .  See, e.g., Thornhill v. Skidmore, 227 N.Y.S.2d 793 (Sup. Ct. 1 96 1 )  (canal). 
89 .  See State v. Bartee, 894 S.W.2d 34, 42 n.9 (Tex. App. 1 994) (holding that white tail 
deer in a natural state of l iberty cannot be subject to theft and criminal mischief statutes because 
Texas statute defined wild animals as a "species that nonnally l ives in a state of nature"); Powers 
v. Palacios, 794 S.W.2d 493, 497 (Tex. App. 1 990) (pit bull kept in defendant' s  residence not a 
wild animal because wild animals are "[a]nimals of an untamable disposition" or "animals in a state 
of nature"). 
90. See White v. Smyth, 2 1 4  S.W.2d 953, 962 (Tex. Civ. App. 1 947) (stating that "the thing 
taken is m ineral in place, as it lies in a state of nature. It is this of which the tenant out of 
possession is deprived, and it is this for which he ought to be compensated . . . .  "). 
9 1 .  See Bydlon v. United States, 1 75 F. Supp. 89 1 ,  895-96 (Ct. Cl. 1 95 9) (referring to a 
national forest) ("It was envisaged that the canoe and foot travel would be the sole means of 
transportation into this perpetuated state of nature."). An example in the context of Native 
American land rights is found in Oregon Dept. ofFish & Wildlife v. Klamath Tribe, 473 U.S. 753,  
756 n.3 ( 1 985)  (citing federal statute). 
92 . See Spiegle v. Borough ofBeach Haven, 2 8 1  A.2d 377, 382 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1 97 1 ). 
9 3 .  See Nettles v. Gritlith, 883 F. Supp. 1 36,  1 46 (E.D. Tex. 1 995) (stating that although 
Jrison conditions may be harsh, the government is "not free to let the state of nature take i ts 
:ourse"); Langston v. Peters, 1 00 F.3d 1 235,  1 2 3 7  (7th Cir. 1 996) (holding that prison officials 
10t liable for rape of inmate by cell mate). 
94. See United States v. American Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, No. 1 3-95 
WCC), 1 993 WL 1 87863, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. May 27, 1 993) ("By leaving parties in a ' state of 
1ature' -that is, by leaving them to address between themselves the question of whether any 
)articular music use . . .  triggered a fee-the court avoided embodying ambiguity and controversy 
n the fee structure itself "); cf Davis v. Richmond, 5 12 F.2d 20 1 , 204-05 ( 1 st Cir. 1 975) ("[I]n 
�ither a state of nature or an organized society . . .  a boardinghouse keeper might reasonably assert 
he right to hold a guest 's  property within the premises until the rent is paid."). But see McKnight 
1. General Motors Corp. ,  908 F.2d 1 04,  1 09 (7th Cir. 1 990) ("Employment at will is not a state 
>fnature but a continuing contractual relation."). 
9 5 .  See Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S.  5 1 6, 526 n. 1 9  ( 1 98 1 )  (noting that the right to 
tppropriate a derelict existed in a state of nature), aff'g 406 N.E.2d 625 (Ind. 1 980). 
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A Environmental Attributes 
Judges commonly describe environmental attributes as existing in a state 
of nature. In these instances, "state of nature" is a name for the p lacement 
or condition of land, plants, animals, water, and minerals antecedent to 
human enterprise or divorced from it. Judges commonly assert in passing 
that thus and such was the location of water, oil, gas, or minerals in  a state 
of nature. In a typical instance, the court in a California case deciding 
riparian rights mentions in passing that " [i]n a state of nature Temecula 
Creek flowed through Nigger Canyon. "96 
Water in a river, lake, or stream is in a state of nature, courts say, if its 
quality or course has not been altered by human agency.97 Polluted water 
exists in a state of nature if the pollution in question is not due to human 
action. Water that humans have dammed, re-routed, or depleted of wildlife 
may no longer exist in a state of nature.98 A court ' s  judgment that a thing 
exists in a state of nature is not necessarily a judgment that the thing is in  
a p ri stine condition, untouched or  unmarred by human enterprise. For 
example, land that exists in a state of nature is land that human beings have 
not yet exploited,99 or have exploited, but not much altered . Uncultivated, 
unworked, unimproved land is in a state of nature until cultivated, worked, 
or improved. Acquiring title to land in a state of nature by adverse 
possession requires that the "adverse" possessor bring about "a change in  
condition," in addition to  the usual requirements of adverse possession . 100 
96. United States v. Fallbrook Pub. Uti! .  Dist., 1 09 F. Supp. 28, 32 (S .D.  Cal .  1 952); see 
also United States v. Fallbrook Pub. Uti! .  Dist. , 1 10 F. Supp. 767, 773-76 (S.D.  Cal .  1 95 3 )  
(describing the path o f  various bodies o f  waters "in a state o f  nature"); Coleville C onfederated 
Tribes v.  Walton, 460 F. Supp. 1 320, 1 334 (E.D. Wash. 1 978) ("In a state of nature, No Name 
Creek entered Omak Lake . . . .  ") . 
97. See, e.g. , Nu-Dwarf Farms, Inc. v. Stratbucker Farms, Ltd. ,  470 N.W.2d 772, 777-78 
(Neb. 1 99 1 )  ("The record indicates that in a state of nature Tax Lot 25 did not receive surface 
waters from Nu-Dwarfs land. Therefore, no natural servitude was impressed upon Tax Lot 25 in 
favor of Nu-Dwarfs land."); Krafka v.  Brase, 3 5 3  N.W.2d 276, 278 (Neb . 1 984 ) ("The C ourt 
concludes that in a state of nature the water simply would not flow in the manner that the plaintiff 
claims. "); Purdy v. Madison County, 55 N.W.2d 6 1 7, 6 1 9  (Neb. 1 952) (concerning an unlawful 
diversion of water, "the question . . .  is  whether the county could properly . . .  dam the natural 
drainage course where the surface waters were wont to flow in a state of nature. "). 
98. Cf ldaho v. Oregon, 462 U.S. l 0 1 7, 1 03 5 ( 1 983) (0'Connor, J., dissenting) (conceming 
the impact of dam construction on fish supply) ("This period did not reflect a pristine and 
irretrievably lost state of nature . "); United States v.  New Mexico, 438 U. S .  696, 7 1 0  ( 1 978) 
(citing federal land use statute requiring that natural features of a region remain in  a state of 
nature). 
99.  See, e.g. , Shellow v. Hagen, 1 0 1  N.W.2d 694, 698 (Wis.  1 960) (allowing public use of 
unimproved property in a state of nature); cf Howard County v .  Carroll, 526 A.2d 996,  1 00 1  (Md. 
Ct. Spec. App. 1 987) (finding that the state of nature is the opposite of a state of cultivation). 
1 00 .  Calhoun v.  Woods, 4 3 1  S .E .2d 285, 287 ( Va. 1 993); Leake v. Richardson, 1 03 S.E.2d 
r I 
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Once cultivated, worked or improved, land may "revert" to a state of 
nature if abandoned and permitted to return to a physical condition 
approximating the prior uncultivated, unworked condition. 101 Faced with 
the need to define the term "park," several judges have cited a declaration 
of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court that the word conveys "the idea of 
open air and space, with the land kept in grass and trees, as if 
approximately in the state of nature ."102 A court ' s  definition of "scenic 
easement" incorporated the idea that certain land uses should  not involve 
"jarring human interference with a state of nature" for "there is enjoyment 
and recreation for the traveling public in viewing a relatively unspoiled 
natural landscape. " 103 
"State of nature" commonly appears in passing as a descriptive term 
designating geographical placement or physical condition. It is not clear 
that all or even most of these appearances have a significant relation to 
social contract theory. The term "state of nature" makes non-trivial 
appearances in cases whose outcomes hinge on whether something is 
located where non-human forces of nature placed it, or whether something 
exists now in a condition for which non-human forces of nature are 
responsible. A defendant ' s  right to be free of additional ad valorem taxes 
may hinge on whether a drug import is a "native" substance "present in a 
state of nature. " 104 The right to produce natural gas from a well may hinge 
on whether the gas in question would have been located at the same site in 
a state of nature. 105 In an action to quiet title to water rights, the United 
States argued that the outcome hinged on whether the water in question 
then existed where it had been located in a state of nature. 106 In another 
case, the plaintiffs alleged that officials operating a dam owned by the 
United States wrongfully diverted water that in a state of nature flowed in 
a direction of benefit to plaintiffs as riparian land owners. 107 Permanent 
impairment of a residential property ' s  market value would support a 
casualty loss deduction to the extent of the permanent change in market 
value, held a court citing evidence that a government project would cause 
227, 234 (Va. 1 958). 
1 0 1 .  Cf Oyama v .  California, 332 U.S .  633, 685 ( 1 948) (Jackson, J . ,  dissenting) ("The lands 
would require continuous cultivation if they were not to revert to a state of nature."). 
1 02 .  795 Fifth Ave. Corp. v .  City of New York, 242 N.Y.S.2d 96 1 ,  971 ( Sup. Ct.  1 963) 
(quoting Laird v. Pittsburgh, 54 A. 324, 325 (Pa. 1 903)). 
1 03 .  Kamrowski v. State, 142 N.W.2d 793, 796 (Wis. 1 966). 
1 04 .  Pharn1acia Fine Chems. ,  Inc. v .  United States, 324 F. Supp: 1 1 1 3 , 1 1 1 8 (Cust. Ct. 
1 97 1 ) . 
1 05 .  See Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Mahan & Rowsey, Inc., 48 B.R. 767, 774 (Bankr. 
W.D. Okla. 1 985). 
1 06 .  See California v. United States, 235 F.2d 647, 655 (9th Cir. 1 956). 
1 07. See Turner v. Kings River Conservation Dist. , 360 F.2d 1 84 ,  1 87 (9th Cir. 1 966). 
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rainwater to run off faster than it would have in a state of nature. 1 08 
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In several categories of doctrine, tort liability hinges on whether a 
condition on a defendant ' s  land exists in a state of nature. Injuries caused 
by conditions on unimproved lands may go uncompensated to the extent 
that courts find no duty of care on the part of land owners for perils 
existing in a state of nature on their property. 109 One crosses, climbs, or 
jogs on an unimproved road, or portion of a road, at  one ' s  peri l .  The 
median strip, but not the main road, exists in a state of nature, according to 
one subtle judge. 1 10 Distinguishing conditions on land that exist in a state 
of nature from those that are of human artifice, courts have generally 
refused to extend the attractive nuisance doctrine that benefits juvenile 
plaintiffs and their families, to dangerous natural conditions on land . 1 1 1 The 
unsettling implication of the doctrine is that a person who would not be  
responsible for omitting to  fence a dangerous pond, would be responsible 
for omitting to fence a dangerous swimming pool of equal size and depth. 
Criminal liability can hinge on the claim that police entered onto land in a 
state of nature--because entry on "unmarked, unoccupied, [and] 
undeveloped" land does not constitute an unreasonable search. 1 12 
Liabil ity for damage caused by an animal depends upon whether the 
offending animal is wild or domesticated. One is not normally l iable for the 
trespasses of ferae naturae-wild animals. Wild animals exist in a state of 
nature. Domesticated or captured animals generally do not. In one case 
illustrative of these principles, a landowner granted an easement to a 
turnpike authority who then built a bridge on the land. 1 1 3 The bridge 
attracted nesting pigeons, and when the pigeons damaged the landowner' s 
adjacent property, he sued. 1 14 The trial court asserted that the turnpike 
1 08 .  See Finkbohner v. United States, 788 F.2d 723 ,  727 ( 1 1 th C ir. 1 986).  
1 09.  See, e.g. , Gregory v.  City of Seattle, 203 P.2d 340, 342 (Wash. 1 949)  (holding city not 
l iable "[m]erely because this area is  in a location which might reasonably be used as a means of 
ingress to the traveled portion of the street"); Belt v.  City of Grand Forks, 68  N.W.2d 1 14 ,  1 20-2 1 
(N.D. 1 95 5 ) .  
1 1 0.  See Belt, 68  N.W.2d a t  1 20-2 1 .  
I l l . See, e.g. , Batzek v .  Betz, 5 1 9  N.E.2d 87, 89-90 (Ill .  App. Ct .  1 988)  (finding that a 
teenager who fel l  from a tree and was rendered quadriplegic while removing dead branches that 
posed risk to camper was owed no duty by the landowner to warn of danger "because the 
unreasonable burden of improving land in a state of nature is great compared to the risk to 
children"); Loney v. McPhillips, 5 2 1  P.2d 340, 342 (Or. 1 974); cf Clarke v. Edging, 5 1 2 P .2d 30, 
3 3 -34 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1 973) (stating that whether a condition on land i s  artificial or natural for 
purposes of the attractive nuisance doctrine in a case seeking damages for death of a child is  a 
question of fact for the jury). 
1 1 2 .  United States v. Sterling, 244 F. Supp. 5 34,  5 3 6  (W.D. Pa. 1 96 5 ). 
1 1 3 .  See Seaboard Airline R.R.  v. Richmond-Petersburg Turnpike Auth . ,  1 2 1  S.E.2d 499, 501  
(Va. 1 96 1 ). 
1 14 .  See id. at 50 1 -02 . 
I 
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authority was not liable because pigeons are wild animals. 1 1 5  However, 
another court held that attracting wild geese to an artificial pond where the 
defendant placed food and tended lame geese rendered the defendant liable 
in nuisance for crop damage done to a neighbor' s lands. u6 A dissenting 
judge in the goose droppings case urged that liability for acts of animals 
existing in the state of nature was contrary to the law. 1 17 A court held that 
state game laws protecting wild animals from off-season hunting extended 
to feral hogs "existing [by definition] in a state of nature. "1 18 
Animals living on property owned by private persons or government 
exist in a state of nature if they have not been domesticated or tamed. For 
example, a wild buck was captured and penned on county land when it 
injured the plaintiff 1 19 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin concluded that 
although the buck was being held in captivity, it was a wild animal whose 
injurious conduct was not the legal responsibility ofits captors . 120 The court 
argued that mature bucks have "untamable" and "ugly" dispositions, 
inclining them to "fight anything, including a man armed with a shovel ." 12 1  
Unlike bucks in captivity, rats in captivity are not wild animals. Albino 
white rats raised for research purposes and judged incapable of surviving 
"in a state of nature" were not "wildlife" for purposes of interpreting the 
Unemployment Compensation Act ' s  provisions exempting agricultural 
labor engaged in raising wildlife . 122 
B. Realms of Risk 
The "state of nature" is a name judges give to the conditions of extreme 
risk they reason is the fate of society without the rule of law. 1 23 The 
Supreme Court ofNew Hampshire once described its state government as 
one that "originates in a social compact running between the State and the 
people, whose end is the protection of man ' s  natural rights. " 124 The court 
went on to explain that, "[a]ccording to eighteenth-century thought, such 
a social compact is a necessity because our natural rights are insecure while 
1 1 5 .  See id. at 502. 
1 1 6 .  See Andrews v. Andrews, 88 S.E .2d 88,  92-93 (N.C .  1 95 5); cf Sickman v, United 
States, 1 84 F.2d 6 1 6 ,  6 1 9-20 (7th C ir. 1 950) (finding government not liable for crop damage 
caused by migratory wild geese allowed to congregate on federal game preserve). 
1 1 7 .  See Andrews, 88 S.E.2d at 93 (Parker, J., dissenting). 
1 1 8 .  Key v. State, 384 S.W.2d 22, 24 (Tenn . l 964 ). 
1 1 9 .  See Hudson v. Janesville Conservation Club, 484 N.W.2d 1 32, 1 33 (Wis. 1 992). 
1 20 .  See id. at 1 35-36.  
1 2 1 .  !d. at 1 36 .  
1 22 .  Sprague-Dawley, Inc. v .  Moore, 1 5 5  N.W.2d 579, 5 82-83 (Wis. 1 968) .  
123 .  See, e.g. , Boddie v. Connecticut, 40 1 U.S.  3 7 1 ,  374 ( 1 97 1 )  ("[I]t is  this inj ection ofthe 
rule of law that allows society to reap the benefits of rejecting what pol itical theorists call the 
'state of nature. "') .  
1 24. State v.  Brosseau, 470 A.2d 869, 877 (N.H. 1 983) .  
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we exist outside of a justly organized society or inside the ' state of 
nature. "' 125 Appeals in case law to the rule of law ideal warn that the state 
of nature is the intolerable alternative to legal order. A "civilized" society 
needs laws and law enforcement as reasonable constraints on individual 
liberty. 
A court deciding whether Mexican defendants enjoy the protections of 
the Bill ofRights protections cited a scholar quoting Blackstone ' s  definition 
that '"absolute rights of individuals"' are those " 'as would belong to their 
persons merely in a state of nature, and which every man is entitled to 
enjoy, whether out of society or in it. "' 126 A dissenting opinion in a West 
Virginia eminent domain case described Hugo Grotius ' s  explication of the 
theory of eminent domain. 1 27 Under this theory, eminent domain is the 
sovereign' s  right because " [t]o wish for an ownership of land that shall not 
be subject to royal rights is to wish for a state ofnature. " 128 Hobbes argued 
in like vein that investing substantially less than absolute rights in the 
sovereign would not effectuate the escape from the state of nature. 129 
Those who breach the social contract ' s  terms against violence are 
subject to just punishment. One court found that persons of both sexes are 
subject to governmental punishment for criminal acts because, "in a state 
of nature no one is in subjection to another. " 130 A civilized society needs 
prisons to confine dangerous criminals who violate the social contract . But 
according to United States Supreme Court Justice Souter, government i s  
obligated to  maintain prisons as  settings for measured punishments, rather 
than as cruel and degrading states of nature. 13 1 Prison conditions cannot be 
permitted to devolve into a state of nature: "Having incarcerated 'persons 
[with] demonstrated proclivit[ies] for antisocial, criminal, and often violent 
conduct . . . having stripped them of virtually every means of self­
protection and foreclosed their access to outside aid, the government and 
its officials are not free to let the state of nature take its course ." 132 
1 2 5 .  !d. 
1 26 .  United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F .2d 1 2 14,  1 220 (9th C ir. 1 988), rev 'd, 4 94 
U.S.  259 ( 1 990) (quoting BERNARD SCHWARTZ, 1 A CO!vllvfENTARYONTHE CONSTITUTIONOF TIIE 
UNITED STATES : RIGHTS OF THE PERSON 1 70 ( 1 968)).  
1 27. See Handley v.  Cook, 252 S .E.2d 1 47, 1 52-53 ( W . Va. 1 979) (McGraw, J. , dissenting).  
1 28.  !d. at 1 5 3 .  
1 29.  See HoBBES, supra note 2 .  
1 30 .  United States v.  Kerr, 1 3  F . 3 d  203, 207 n . 3  (7th Cir. 1 99 3 )  (quoting WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENT ARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 28-29). 
1 3 1 .  See Farmer v .  Brennan, 5 1 1 U.S. 825,  832-33 ( 1 994) (holding that the federal 
govenunent is not liable for beatings and rape, unless it was deliberately indifferent to the 
constitutional rights of a preoperative transsexual with feminine characteristics imprisoned in a 
federal penitentiary for men). 
1 32 .  Id. at 8 3 3 .  The quoted l anguage from Fam1er has been cited repeatedly. See, e.g., In re 
Haley v. Gross, 8 6  F .3d 630,  640 (7th Cir. 1 996): Dodson v. Reno, 958  F .  Supp. 4 9 ,  5 5  (D.P.R. 
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Parties to the social contract yield rights of criminal enforcement to the 
state. Citizens must rely upon the judicial system to punish, but a person in 
a "state of nature" can secure his rights with justice for himself 133 In a case 
holding that a sheriffs deputies were immune from liability for a jailhouse 
suicide, a dissenting judge argued that the fact that public officers are in the 
service of the public "does not mean, however, that they are free agents, 
existing in a state of nature" without duties to specific citizens to whom 
they should be liable in tort. 134 S imilarly, a Wisconsin appeals court argued 
that an agent of the Ford Motor Credit Company entitled to repossess an 
automobile in the possession of a debtor is not entitled to breach the peace 
to accomplish his or her ends, since zealously pursued p rivate remedies 
threaten to revert society to a state of nature. 135 
C. Freedom to Contract 
Thus far I have adduced examples of courts using the term "state of 
nature" to denote (a) characteristics of environmental attributes and (b) 
realms of risk to human safety. "State of nature" also denotes a judicial 
freedom, including the freedom to contract. An "at will" employee exists 
in a state of nature and is therefore free to bargain from that state with 
unions or employers on terms of mutual interest . A judge has asserted, 
however, that " [  e ] mployment at will is not a state of nature but a 
continuing contractual relation. "136 The state of affairs before a collective 
bargaining agreement "is not quite Hobbes's state ofnature. " 137 To say that 
it is not quite a state of nature may be a way to suggest the expectations of 
cooperation apply. 
D. Things Without Owners 
In the law of finds, abandoned property and shipwrecks exist in a state 
of nature. 138 Anyone who finds or salvages them may legitimately claim 
1 997); Hadix v.  Johnson, 947 F. Supp. 1 1 00, 1 1 02 (E.D. Mich. 1 996); Southern Ohio Correctional 
Facility, 1 66 F.R.D. 3 9 1 ,  397 (S.D. Ohio 1 996); cf Madrid v.  Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1 1 46, 1 245 
(N.D.  Cal .  1 995) (stating that "govenunent officials must ensure that prisons . . .  do  not 
degenerate into places that violate basic standards of decency and humanity"). 
1 3 3 .  See Garry v. Garry, 467 N. Y . S .2d 1 75 ,  1 76 n . l (Sup. Ct. 1 983)  (quoting Locke, supra 
note 2, at 1 76).  
1 34. Wilson v.  Sponable, 439 N. Y. S.2d 549, 557 (App. Div. 1 98 1 ). 
1 35 .  See Hollibush v. Ford Motor Credit Co. ,  508 N.W.2d 449, 453  (Wis. Ct .  App. 1 993). 
1 36 .  McKnight v. General Motors Corp. ,  908 F.2d 1 04, 1 09 (7th Cir. 1 990). 
1 37. See Merk v. Jewel Food Stores, 734 F. Supp. 3 30,  332 (N.D. Ill .  1 990). 
1 38 .  See, e.g. , Lathrop v. Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel, 8 1 7 F. Supp. 953, 965 
(M.D. Fla. 1 993)  (observing that in maritime law a found shipwreck is  assumed to have returned 
to a state of nature). 
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them as  property. 139 Ajar of  money, notwithstanding all the human artifice 
and culture it represents, if found buried in the earth exists in a state of 
nature . 140 Implicit in the law of finds (and the law of adverse possession) is 
the idea that things not plainly owned are unowned and may be allocated 
as though they had reverted to the commons. 1 41 To award ownership to 
finders and salvagers is to adopt the principle that things should belong to 
those whose labor contributes to their value .  The fiction that lost money 
exists in a state of nature gives courts a basis for treating the person whose 
effort and luck leads to recovery as its rightful owner. 
III. THE SOCIAL CON1RACT 
What is the juridical meaning of "social contract"? To what does it 
refer? In the dozens of cases in which it appears, the term "social contract" 
variously denotes, either (a) principles of just and fair government with 
which rational persons should agree, would agree, or have in fact agreed; 142 
(b) the American Revolution and the United States Constitution/43 (c) a 
polity 's  entire body of positive law, including its constitutional law; 144 or (d) 
specific quotidian bargains, agreements, and commercial contracts struck 
between, for example, employers and workers. 145 
1 39 .  See id. 
140 .  See Couch v. Schley, 272 S .W.2d 1 7 1 ,  1 73 (Tex. Civ. App. 1 954) (stating that $ 1 000 
in currency found while working on another' s  land belonged to the finder because unclaimed items 
revert to a state of nature). 
1 4 1 .  See Hener v. United States, 525 F. Supp. 350, 353  (S .D.N.Y. 1 98 1 )  (stating, in a dispute 
over rights to salvage silver off of sunken barge "the common law of finds treats property that is  
abandoned as returned to the state of nature"). 
142.  See Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, 5 1 5  U . S .  8 1 9, 856 ( 1 995)  (Thomas, J. , 
dissenting); California Dep't  of Corrections v. Morales, 5 1 4  U.S .  499, 5 1 5  ( 1 995)  (Stevens, J . ,  
dissenting); Landgraf v. USI Film Prod . ,  5 1 1  U.S .  244, 267 ( 1 994) (citing Madison' s  view that 
bills of attainder and exposit facto laws "contrary to the first principles of the social compact"); 
Lovelace v. L
'
eechburg Area Sch. Dist. , 3 10 F. Supp. 579 (W.D. Pa. 1 970) (suggesting that the 
normative basis of the Ninth Amendment may be the social contract principle of John Locke and 
Thomas Jefferson "according to which individuals living in a ' state of nature' prior to the 
establishment of civil society enjoyed certain unalienable natural rights . . .  and governments were 
established by consent of the governed for the purpose of protecting and making secure such pre­
existing rights"); Curtis v. Kline, 666 A.2d 265, 274 (Pa. 1 995)  (Montemuro, J . ,  dissenting). 
1 4 3 .  See Echols v. Dekalb County, 247 S .E.2d 1 14,  1 1 8 (Ga. Ct. App. 1 978) (Deen, P .J . ,  
dissenting) ("The people acknowledged parting of this power by the social contract of  forming one 
United States of America. "); California ex rei. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Gardner, No. 03A0 1 -9508-
CH-00253 ,  1 996 WL 1 1 394, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 10, 1 996). 
144 .  The idea that the law is a social contract affording parties various categories of rights 
is suggested by, for example, Cornelius v. Benevolent Protective Order of the Elks, 3 82 F. Supp. 
1 1 82, 1 1 99 (D. Conn. 1 974) ("We recognize . . .  that ' social rights' and ' civil rights' are but 
extremes on the broad spectmm of the ' social contract. '"). 
145 .  See supra Part I. C .  
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A Social Contract as Consensual, Rational Principles 
Under the first usage, judges employ the expression "social contract" to 
denote principles of law and government with which rational persons 
should, would, or do agree in exchange for greater freedom and security. 
Functioning as natural law, here the social contract is construed primarily 
as a moral reality of legal significance, rather than as a specific document 
or historical event. For example, in Vanhorne 's Lessee v. Dorrance146 the 
Supreme Court declared void and unconstitutional Pennsylvania' s 
Confirming Act of 1 789 . 147 Under the Act, Connecticut settlers were 
permitted to claim land in Pennsylvania owned by citizens of Pennsylvania 
for which Pennsylvanians would be compensated. 148 Justice Patterson 
argued that " [t]he preservation of property then is a primary object ofthe 
social compact" and that "it is contrary to the principles of social alliance" 
to divest citizens of land without just compensation. 149 Justice Patterson 
also referred to certain legislative powers as having been "urged from the 
nature of the social compact." 1 50 Patterson ' s  analysis treated the social 
compact not as a historical fact, but as a normative reality of social 
organization with distinct content accessible to the courts charged with 
resolving disputes. In Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 1 5 1 a major precedent in 
the field of public health law, the Court found that the social contract 
authorized the government to exercise its police powers for the protection 
of public health. 1 52 So, a private person who prefers not to submit to 
vaccination for a contagious disease can be justly compelled by law to 
submit, because protection from infectious diseases is something all 
rational, self-interested persons would choose. 
The appeal to principles of social contract has been condemned as 
illegitimate by recent judges favoring more positivistic directions for 
jurisprudence. 1 53 It is not only in older cases, however, that courts refer to 
the social contract as if it were a taken-for-granted l iteral feature of 
jurispolitical normative reality. In 1 986, a judge wrote that by virtue of the 
social contract, the very purpose of the states is to protect the "sanctity of 
111 human life. " 1 54 Referring to a dispute over an oil drilling concession in 
146. 2 U . S .  (1 Dall . )  3 04 ( 1 795) .  
147.  See id. at 320. 
1 4 8 .  See id. at 306. 
149. !d. at 3 1 0 .  
1 50 .  !d. at  3 1 0- 1 1 .  
1 5 1 .  1 97 U.S .  1 I ( 1 905).  
1 52 .  See id. at 27. 
1 53 .  See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 5 1 7 U.S. 44, 1 67 ( 1 996) (Stevens, J. , dissenting) 
rej ecting claim of Justice Chase that legislation in violation "of the social compact cannot be 
onsidered a rightful exercise of legislation authority"). 
1 54 .  Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp. ,  Inc. ,  497 N.E.2d 626, 640 & n . 1 (Mass. 1 986); cf 
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the Persian Gulf as a political dispute between sovereigns, one federal court 
commented in Occidental of Umm al Qaywayn, Inc. v. A Certain Cargo of 
Petroleum155 that " [i]n their external relations, sovereigns are bound by no 
law; they are like our ancestors before the recognition or imposition of the 
social contract. "156 This Hobbesian understanding of sovereignty presumes 
that the justification for the sovereign power of political states is that 
precisely this kind of power was possessed by individuals and transferred 
by individuals to the state through the social contract. This same court 
adopted John Austin ' s  teaching that among sovereign nations there can be  
no genuine binding law to resolve conflicts. 1 57 
1 .  In Tort and Property Law 
Tort and property law are the home of numerous examples of "social 
contract" used by judges to denote consensual rational principles .  I have 
already mentioned the role an overtly natural law-based appeal to the social 
contract played in the Supreme Court of Georgia ' s  landmark right to 
privacy decision, Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co. 1 58 Who, 
asked the court, would sign on to the social contract without the promise 
of protection for personal identity?1 59 Social contract notions also played 
a role in the development of the fault principle in American tort law in the 
nineteenth century. In Losee v. Buchanan/60 the New York state court 
confronted a dilemma: it could abandon seemingly relevant English 
precedent and appear unprincipled, or embrace it and appear unrealistic. A 
landowner whose personal and real property was damaged by an exploding 
boiler operated by a paper mill located on adjacent property sought 
compensation under the rule of the English case Rylands v. Fletcher. 1 61 
That case endorsed a rule of strict liability for damages to adjacent property 
caused by "non-natural" uses ofland and by "escaping perils . " 162 To follow 
the English rule of strict liability posed a threat to the progress of American 
industry, which seemed dependent upon accepting a degree of commercial 
risk and peril .  To adopt a negligence principle outright posed a threat to the 
Washington v .  Glucksberg, 1 1 7 S .  Ct.  2258, 2275 ( 1 997) (upholding statutes banning physician 
assisted suicides). 
1 55 .  577 F .2d 1 1 96 (5th C ir. 1 978). 
1 56 .  !d. at 1 204; see also DeRoburt v.  Gannett Co. 548 F. Supp. 1 370, 1 376 (D. Haw. 1 982) 
(citing Occidental). 
1 57.  See Occidental, 577 F.2d at 1 204-05 .  
1 58 .  50 S.E.  68 (Ga. 1 905) .  For additional discussion o[Pavesich, see supra notes 2 9-30 and 
accompanying text. 
1 59 .  See Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 70. 
1 60. 5 1  N.Y. 476 ( 1 873). 
1 6 1 .  L.R. 3 H.L. 330 ( 1 868).  
1 62. !d. 
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model of precedent-driven adjudication. 
Judge Earl ' s  escape from the dilemma was no bold rejection ofEnglish 
precedent as one finds in the New Hampshire decision of Brown v. 
Collins. 163 In that case the court rejected the rules of trespass and strict 
liability validated in Rylands as rules "introduced in England at an immature 
stage of English jurisprudence, and an undeveloped stage of agriculture, 
manufacture, and commerce, when the nation had not settled down to those 
modern, progressive, industrial pursuits which the spirit of the common 
law, adapted to all conditions of society, encourages and defends."164 
Instead, Judge Earl claimed to carve out an exception to the strict law of 
trespass, an area oflaw, he said, that had always admitted of exceptions. 165 
In addition, Judge Earl appealed with high rhetorical flair to an ad hoc 
mixture of utilitarian and social contractarian principles to support the 
negligence rule .  "By becoming a member of civilized society," Earl wrote, 
hinting at government by consent, "I am compelled to give up many of my 
natural rights, but I receive more than a compensation from the surrender 
by every other man of the same rights, and the security, advantage and 
protection which the laws give me." 166 Modern enterprises that provide 
benefits, but also impose risks on all who would benefit, must take on the 
burdens of accidental injury: 
We must have factories, machinery, dams, canals and 
railroads. They are demanded by the manifold wants of 
mankind, and lay at the basis of our civilization. . . . He 
receives his compensation for such damage by the general 
good, in which he shares, and the right which he has to place 
the same things upon his lands . . . .  I hold my property subject 
to the risk that it may be unavoidably or accidentally injured 
by those who live near me . . . .  Most of the rights of property, 
as well as of person, in the social state, are not absolute but 
relative, and they must be so arranged and modified, not 
necessarily infringing upon natural rights, as upon the whole 
to promote the general welfare .  1 67 
As Judge Earl explained it, the "manifold wants" of accident victims 
themselves countermand strict liability as the principle of tort 
compensation. Under the negligence regime, accident victims who leave 
court feeling like losers, are winners in a scheme of reciprocal cooperation. 
Courts have employed social contract principles to illuminate the fault 
163. 53 N.H. 44 2 (1873). 
164. !d. 
165. See id. 
166. Losee v .  Buchanan, 51 N.Y.  476, 485 (1873). 
167. !d. at 484-485. 
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p rinciple, and also to illuminate limitations on the principle, such as the 
doctrine that no one may recover in negligence for purely economic injuries 
and the doctrine known as the "fireman's  rule." 168 In Sandarac Ass 'n, Inc. 
v. WR. Frizzell Architects, Inc. , 169 a condominium sought to sue an 
architectural firm for negligence resulting in economic losses. 170 In 
explaining the traditional bar against negligence actions  for purely 
economic losses, the court emphasizes negligence doctrines as "allocat[ing] 
. . . risks among the members of society because private agreements . . . 
cannot effectively accomplish the task."171 The court added in a footnote 
that contemporary negligence doctrines have roots in the nineteenth century 
when they were created by judges influenced by the "political theories of 
social contract" of Hobbes and Rousseau . 172 The court appears to have 
thought that the social contract case for negligence l iability among 
strangers and neighbors would not justify liability for losses that could have 
been avoided had parties struck a bargain in advance. 
In a case determining whether injured public safety employees can 
recover against a citizen, contrary to the "fireman' s  rule," the court noted 
in defense of the rule that " [i ]ndeed, it would be a breach of the social 
contract for all of us to say to any one of us ' fire and police protection are 
available only at your peril . "' 173 The point seems to be that emergency 
assistance is one of the things we enter the social contract to obtain, and it 
should therefore be available as inexpensively as possible. 
2. In Criminal Law 
Courts appeal to the idea of the social contract to help describe both the 
wrongness of criminal acts, and the rightness of criminal prohibitions174 and 
procedures. 175 Judges explicate the genesis of criminal prosecutions and 
evidentiary requirements of criminal trials with the assistance of social 
contract ideas. For example: 
From the earliest beginnings of human society, as people 
bound themselves together under a variety of social contracts, 
1 68.  See Sam v. Wesley, 647 N.E.2d 382, 3 84 (Ind. Ct. App. 1 995) .  
1 69 .  609 So.  2d 1 349 (Fla. 2d DCA 1 992). 
1 70 .  See id at 1 3 5 1 .  
1 7 1 .  !d. at 1 353 .  
1 72.  Jd. at n.4 . 
1 73 .  Fox v. Hawkins, 594 N.E.2d 493 ,  496 (Ind. Ct. App. 1 992). 
1 74 .  See People v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 603-04 (Cal. 1 997) (upholding injunction 
prohibiting gang members from associating \vith one another); Roe v.  Butterworth, 958 F. Supp. 
1 569,  1 5 82 (S.D. Fla. 1 997) (upholding prostitution ban on grounds that protecting morals is a 
compelling state interest incorporated into the social contract). 
1 75 .  See Agard v. Portondo, 1 1 7 F .3d  696, 7 1 7  (2d Cir. 1 997) (stating that defendant' s  right 
to be heard was one of the first principles of the compact). 
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they promulgated rules of behavior for the group and they 
provided for the enforcement of those rules. Whenever the 
tenets of acceptable behavior were transgressed, men bound 
themselves together as a posse comitatus . . .  and demanded 
an answer to the question, "WHODUN1T?: Who killed the 
boy?, Who stole the pig?, Who burned the cottage?"176 
3 1 
Locke ' s  social contract theory provides for the possibility that breaking an 
unjust law can be justifiable. A federal judge suggested that criminal "draft 
dodgers" wrongly seek to justify disobeying the law on the basis of 
individualistic social contract theory. 177 
Social contract theory has served the need for providing a philosophic 
justification for punishment in general178 and for particular punishments, 
such as disenfranchisemenri79 and the death penalty. 1 80 Affirming a death 
penalty conviction, a court opined that : 
It is not vengeance for society to require the same price to be 
paid by one who has intentionally taken a life under 
circumstances where he knows the cost. It is the fulfillment of 
the terms of our social contract. It is the essence of general 
deterrence that the price must be paid.  181 
Dissenting from the majority opinion in Roberts v. Louisiana, 1 82 Justice 
Rehnquist argued that to commit a crime is to breach the social contract. 183 
Roberts held that a Louisiana statute mandating the death penalty for 
1 76 .  Jacobs v. State, 4 1 5  A.2d 590, 596 (Md. Ct.  Spec. App. 1 980); see also People v. Wynn, 
424 N. Y.S.2d 664, 667 (Sup. Ct. 1 980) ("Anglo-American criminal procedure . . .  is a corporal 
part of our social contract covenanted by the Constitution."); State v. Trexler, 3 34 S .E.2d 4 14, 4 1 7  
(N. C .  Ct. App. 1 985)  (Becton, J . ,  concurring) ("[I]mplicit i n  our criminal justice system i s  the 
social contract notion that in exchange for our inability to discover the ' absolute' truth, we assure 
criminal defendants that we will provide them as fair a trial as humanly possible.") 
1 77. United States v.  Moore, 356 F. Supp. 1 32 1 ,  1 323 (S.D.N. Y.  1 972) (discussing an 
"individualistic adherence to some sort of personal Social Contract" alleged by defendant to 
extinguish criminal intent). 
1 78 .  See State v.  Perry, 6 1 0  So. 2d 746, 767 (La. 1 992) (citing Immanuel Kant and Jeffrey 
Murphy) ("The retributory theory of punishment presupposes that each human being possesses 
autonomy, a kind of rational freedom which entitles him or her to dignity and respect as a person 
which is morally sacred and inviolate, but that an original social contract was entered by which 
the people constituted themselves a state."). 
1 79 .  See Shepherd v .  Trevino, 575 F.2d 1 1 1 0, 1 1 1 5  (5th Cir. 1 978) (felons "have breached 
the social contract and, like insane persons, have raised questions about their ability to vote 
responsibly"). 
1 80 .  See Vandiver v.  State, 480 N.E. 9 1 0, 9 1 5  (Ind. 1 985) .  
1 8 1 .  !d. 
1 82 .  43 1 U.S.  6 3 3  ( 1 976). 
1 83 .  See id. at 646. 
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certain crimes was unconstitutional under the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendment, absent provisions for considering particularized mitigating 
factors that might bear on the imposition of the penalty. 1 84 Justice 
Rehnquist observed that : "In all murder cases, and of course this one, the 
State has an interest in protecting its citizens from such u ltimate attacks� 
this surely is at the core of the Lockean ' social contract' idea ."1 85 
It is indeed a feature ofLocke's  social contract theory that a principal 
function of the state is to protect the physical integrity of ind ividuals .  Locke 
held that persons contract for mutual, reciprocal protection of our rights. 
Of course, it does not follow from social contract principles that once a 
murderer is apprehended, he or she must be put to death .  Nor does it 
follow that felons should be disenfranchised, although this was urged in 
Shepherd v. Trevino. 1 86 Those who have "manifested a fundamental 
antipathy to the criminal laws . . .  have breached the social contract and . 
. . have raised questions about their ability to vote responsibly ." 1 87 Judges 
also have offered the social contract to justify civil forfeiture in narcotics 
cases. A historical account of the origins of, and rationale for, forfeiture in 
United States v. 785 Saint Nicholas Ave. /88 included an appeal to 
Blackstone : "The true reason for permitting forfeiture, according to 
Blackstone, was that it is a part of the price a citizen must pay for breaking 
the social contract ." 189 
Judges appeal to the flexible idea of the social contract in arguments 
favoring capital punishment as the just punishment of cop-killers� but, 
interestingly, judges also appeal to the social contract in arguments for a 
strict requirement that police officers exercise their powers with 
appropriate restraint, for the sake of the "rule oflaw." 190 In Roberts, Justice 
Rehnquist argued that breaching the social contract by murdering a police 
officer is especially egregious since police officers "are l iterally the foot 
soldiers of society 's  defense of ordered liberty. " 19 1  In Briggs v. Malley, 1 92 
the court cited Locke and asserted that " (t]he exercise of police power 
within the law is the very foundation ofthe social contract ."1 93 Combining 
the invocations to Locke in Briggs and Roberts, the social contract gives 
1 84 .  See id. at 637. 
1 85 .  !d. at 646. 
1 86. See 575 F.2d 1 1 1 0 ,  1 1 1 5  (5th Cir. 1 978). 
1 87.  Id. 
1 88 .  983 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1 993 ). 
1 89. !d. at 402. 
1 90.  Stroik v .  Ponseti, 683 So. 2d 1 342, 1 349 (La. Ct. App. 1 996)  (stating that the social 
contract confers a duty on a police officer "to exercise . . .  respect and concern for the well-being 
of those he is employed to protect and serve"). 
1 9 1 .  Roberts v .  Louisiana, 43 1 U.S. 633, 647 ( 1 997) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
1 92 .  748 F.2d 7 1 5  ( 1 st Cir. 1 984), aff'd, 475 U.S .  335  ( 1 986). 
1 93 .  !d. at 7 1 9-20. 
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police officers a special role in securing persons and property, but 
constrains them to adhere to the laws that society establishes to protect the 
persons and property of persons suspected of criminal involvement. 
Other cases characterize criminal wrongs as breaches of the social 
contract . In a case involving possible government entrapment of a narcotics 
dealer, the court characterized criminal harms as a "violation of the social 
contract. " 194 S imilarly, another court stated that criminals and juvenile 
delinquents have, by their wrongdoing, breached the social contract. 195 In 
one case, a pro se criminal defendant humbly described his own criminal 
transactions and others' as having "broke our social contracts [sic] . " 196 
Parties to the social contract bargain with one another or the state for 
protection from serious harms. Individuals give up a measure ofliberty for 
a measure of protection. The social contract authorizes society to limit the 
liberty of persons who interfere with the very interests whose protection 
motivates rational persons to consent by contract to collective authority. A 
corollary ofthis understanding is the further understanding that the liberty 
of persons whose conduct does not injure the essential rights and interests 
of others may not be infringed . For David A.J. Richards and like-minded 
con tractarians advocating constitutional protection of privacy, it seems to 
follow that even dangerous and immoral conduct cannot be prohibited by 
criminal regulation, if no one else ' s  rights and interests are violated; and 
that neither homosexual nor heterosexual consensual adult sex can be 
legitimately prohibited by criminal laws. One court observed that the right 
to privacy has antecedents in Rousseau and Locke, but nonetheless 
concluded the regulation of sexual conduct is permissible "even . . .  [in a 
nation] founded upon notions of social contract, as ours was ." 197 
B. Social Contract as Revolution and Constitution 
Judges have written about the social compact as though it were an 
actual historical event. Very early references to the "social contract" in 
American case law sometimes seem to presuppose the literal existence of 
a binding agreement with determinate terms forged between either specific 
individuals or groups, or between individuals, groups, and government . 198 
1 94 .  People v .  Juillet, 475 N.W.2d 786, 8 1 1 n .5  (Mich. 1 9 9 1 )  (Boyle, J., concurring in part 
& dissenting in part). 
1 95 .  See Doe v. New Jersey Division of Youth & Family Servs. ,  429 A.2d 596 ,  600 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1 98 1  ) .  
1 96 .  Alexander v. State, 447 A.2d 880, 886 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1 982). 
1 97.  Schochet v. State, 54 1 A.2d 1 83 , 205 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1 988) (Wilner, J . ,  dissenting). 
1 98 .  See, e.g. , Vanhorne' s  Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S.  ( I  Dal l . )  304, 3 1 0- 1 1 ( 1 795) .  It is not 
only early cases that imply that the American Revolution created a social contract. See, e.g. , Lusch 
v. State, 387 A.2d 306, 309 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1 978) ("It was in the very act of ratifying a new 
social contract in 1 788 that we perceived the need for a set of fundamental protections . . . .  ") . 
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In Calder v .  Bull, 199 Supreme Court Justice Chase associated the erection 
ofthe United States Constitution with the formation of a "social compact," 
whose "nature and terms" depended upon the "purposes for which men 
enter into society. "200 In Dawson 's Lessee v. Godfrey, 201 a Supreme Court 
case upholding a Maryland law depriving a British citizen from inheriting 
land in the state, Justice Johnson refers to aliens as "never having been a 
party in our social compact ."202 While not strictly identifying the compact 
as the United States Constitution, Johnson' s reference to the social 
compact seems to imply a pact among actual persons, with a knowable 
content. The idea of the social contract would be used similarly to exclude 
aliens in other cases, in which the rights of citizens and the (inferior) rights 
of non-citizens would be controverted . Cooper v. Teljair03 concerned the 
disposition of property belonging to someone who had been banished for 
treason. 204 The Court upheld the power of the state to confiscate the 
personal property of a traitor, asserting that the power of government to 
banish and confiscate "grows out of the very nature of the social compact 
. . .  inherent in the legislature. "205 
In recent decades, as in the eighteenth and nineteenth century, judges 
have sometimes expressly depicted the formation of the American 
government as a social contract .206 Judges have depicted ratification of the 
United States Constitution in 1 788  as a social contract, whose B ill of 
Rights is "a set ofbuilt-in limitations" on government. 207 One court' s high­
toned characterization of popular elections appealed to the social contract. 
In this case, which was brought by a defeated contender in a county 
government election, the court declared that "[e]ach election sees a 
convergence in space-time when each of us by law is  as equal as when we 
were created" and that election day is more than a "ritual renewal of the 
social contract. "208 However appealing it might be to view the centuries-old 
Constitution as a social contract, it seems more plausible to regard 
government institutions created by a contemporary democratic electorate 
as a "renewed" social contract . 
1 99 .  3 U.S .  (3 Dall . )  386 ( 1 798) .  
200.  !d. at 388 .  
20 1 .  8 U.S .  ( 4 Cranch) 32 1 ( 1 808). 
202. !d. at 323 .  
203 . 4 U.S .  (4 Dall . )  1 4  ( 1 800). 
204. See id. at 1 4- 1 5 .  
205 .  !d. at 1 9 . 
206. See Echols v. Dekalb County, 247 S .E.2d 1 14 ,  1 1 8 (Ga. Ct .  App. 1 978) (Dean, J. , 
dissenting) (dissenting from a decision upholding the immunity of a county from a suit by a county 
employee seeking back wages, and signaling general opposition to the idea of sovereign immunity 
by citing article entitled "Hobbes, Holmes and Hitler"). 
207. Von Lusch v. State, 387 A.2d 306, 309 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1 978) .  
208.  Wilbourn v.  Hobson, 608 So. 2d 1 1 87, 1 1 96 (Miss. 1 992) (Robertson, J . ,  concurring). 
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Nineteenth-century juri sts employed an arsenal of arguments in defense 
of slavery, some of which owed a debt to social contractarian philosophy.209 
One argument stated that the United States Constitution was a white-only 
social compact, designed to protect slavery as a social and economic 
institution. Justice Taney, authored the Supreme Court ' s  opinion in the 
notorious 1 856  Dred Scott decision denying federal citizenship to free 
blacks and slaves. 210 Taney thus vindicated the opinion of the Court in  
Prigg v. Pennsylvanid-11 who defended slave holding "as a cherished right, 
incorporated into the social compact, and sacredly guarded by law."212 A 
second contractarian argument judges used to support slavery posits a 
hypothetical contract under whose terms blacks rationally agree to 
subordinate themselves to whites in exchange for protection. In State v. 
Post, 213 the New Jersey Supreme Court argued along these lines in an effort 
to show that slavery is not logically inconsistent with liberal egalitarian 
principles. 214 The court argued that slavery was the best deal blacks could 
get in their quest to escape the state of nature, given their l imited natural 
endowments .2 1 5 Rational persons of African ancestry chose slavery, we are 
urged to believe. 
C. The Legal System as a Social Contract 
It is one thing to view the American Revolution or federal Constitution 
as social contracts, and something else to view the positive legal system as 
a whole as a social contract . A number of judges have characterized the 
United States' legal system as a social contract . Judge B lumenfeld does so 
twice in a case dating from the 1 970s. 216 The first time, he describes the 
American system of law as a "social contract" of social and civil rights.217 
His use of scare quotes around the term "social contract" implies self-
209.  See generally 1 2PROSLAVERYTHOUGHT,lDEOLOGY, ANDPOUTICS (Paul Finkelman ed. , 
1 989); Anita L. Allen & Thaddeus Pope, Social Contract Theory, Slavery, and the Antebellum 
Courts, in A COMPANION TO AFRICAN AMERlCANPHlLOSOPHY (Tommy Lott & John Pittman eds. ,  
forthcoming 1 999) (manuscript on file with author). 
2 1 0.  See Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S .  ( 1 9  Howe) 393 ,  404-05; Anthony R. Chase, Race, 
Culture, and Contract Law: From the Cottonfield to the Courtroom, 28  CoNN. L. REv. l ,  2 1  
( 1 995) (finding that Justice Taney in Scott based his argument on the social contract theory of 
government); cf CHARLES W. MILLS, THE RACIAL CONTRACT ( 1 996) (arguing that a global 
agreement among whites insures blacks' subordination). 
2 1 1 .  4 1  U.S. 539  ( 1 842). 
2 12 .  !d. at 660 . 
2 1 3 .  20 N.J.L. 368 ( 1 845).  
2 14 .  See id. 
2 1 5 .  See id. at 385-86. 
2 1 6 . See Cornelius v. Benevolent Protective Order of the Elks, 3 82 F .  Supp. 1 1 82, 1 1 99, 
1 200 n.26 (D. Conn. 1 974 ). 
2 1 7. See id. at 1 1 99 .  
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awareness of the fictional nature of the social contract. The second time, 
the judge uses the term without scare quotes in a footnote referring to 
"histories which emphasize the 39th Congress '  ideological perspective and 
its perception that it was fundamentally changing the social contract."21 8 
Federal judges have implied that the governments and laws of other nations 
are social contracts, subject to birth and death with the political tides. 219 (It 
stands to reason that if the people of the United States are parties to a 
social contract, so are the people of other nations.) 
InMonarchlnsurance Co. v. District of Columbia, 220 the federal district 
court rej ected a plaintitr s claim that government has a duty, "arising from 
the common law and ancient English statutes," to  compensate for losses 
that resulted from race riots in the District of Columbia. 221 Such a duty, 
plaintiff argued, was "epitomized in the notion of a ' social contract' 
between the state and its citizens to preserve social order and the property 
of the citizens against mob violence."222 A technical question raised by this 
plaintiff' s perspective is whether the social contract is a citizen-to-state pact 
or a pact among individuals to form a state with particular powers and 
duties .  In another case, the characterization of the social contract clearly 
assumed that the contract is an individual-to-individual pact, an "agreement 
between the members of society by which each member undertakes duties 
in consideration for the benefit received when all members fulfill similar 
duties. "223 
D. Contracts and Reliance Interests as Social Contracts 
The relationship between social contract theory and the law of contracts 
holds special interest . 224 Contemporary legal theorists commonly point at 
the large role the idea of contract came to play in the jurisprudence of the 
nineteenth century, following the demise of status-based legalism. 225 
Nineteenth century formalist judges were unwilling to ascribe legal duties 
in the absence of contractual relations, and upheld the terms of contracts 
2 1 8 . Id. at 1200 n.26. 
2 1 9 . See Associated Imports, Inc. v. International Longshoremen's  Ass'n, 609 F. Supp. 595,  
597 (S .D.N. Y .  1 985) (finding that whether Soviet labor was "forced" depends on the "social 
contract between the Soviet state and its citizens"); Banco Nacionale de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan 
Bank, 505 F. Supp. 4 1 2 , 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1 980), aff'd in part, 658 F .2d 875 (2d Cir. 1 98 1 )  
(detailing a dispute between Cuba and Chase Manhattan Bank). 
220. 353  F. Supp. 1 249 (D.D.C.  1 973). 
22 1 .  !d. at 1 259 .  
222 .  !d. 
223.  Sandarac Ass 'n  v. W.R. Frizzell Architects, Inc., 609 So. 2d  1 349,  1 353  n.4 (Fla. 2d  
DCA 1 992). 
224. See Boyle, supra note 53, at 373. 
225. Cf id. at 388.  
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strictly, as final expressions of the will of the parties.226 If these judges had 
a view about the requirements of the social contract, it was that the social 
contract required strict enforcement of actual, everyday contracts. 
Modern judges do not always assume that the social contract compels 
the enforcement of actual contracts. Holding that the landlord of a limited­
profit apartment complex was entitled to a higher rent ordered by a housing 
commissioner rather than the rent set out in the oldest tenants' original 
lease, a New York court stated : "As Rousseau recognized in his theory of 
the social contract, the individual living in society relinquishes certain ofhis 
liberties, including absolute freedom_ to contract, in return for the benefits 
of living in an organized society."227 A legal system based on the social 
contract may, ironically, need to limit freedom of contract. 228 
The relevance of the social contract to contract law is not limited to any 
special status that actual contracts may or may not have within a legal 
system conceived to be a product of a social contract. In a couple of 
contexts the courts have chosen to characterize actual contracts as social 
contracts or compacts. Thus in Edwards v. Leopoldi, 229 a judge asserted 
that labor union collective bargaining agreements are not mere contracts, 
but social compacts. 230 In S.D. Warren Co. v. United Paperworkers, 
International Union Local ] 069,231 the court was asked to decide whether 
an employer could overturn the decision of an arbitrator to reinstate 
employees terminated for possession of marijuana in the workplace. 232 
Emphasizing the cost and emotional intensity oflabor negotiations, and the 
"balance of rights and obligations . . .  essential to the administration of the 
enterprise," the court characterized the management-union contract as a 
social contract " [  d]ealing with the economic survival of all concerned . "233 
Thus, "the wills of the parties are tempered and accommodated to the point 
where the meeting of the minds is forged into a social contract, the 
collective will of all .  "234 In Rodgers v. Workers ' Compensation Appeals 
Board,235 Justice Reynoso, dissenting in an action upholding the 
determination of a California workers' compensation appeals  board, argued 
that the workers compensation statutes create a social contract between the 
226. Cf id. (analyzing competing formalist and realist conceptions of contract l iability). 
227. Lafayette Morrison Housing, Inc. v. Patterson, 292 N. Y.S.2d 785, 789 (Civ. Ct. 1 968). 
228. See id. But cf DuPont v. Admiral Ins. Co., No. 89 C-AU-99, 1 996 WL 769627 at *2 
(Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 24, 1 996) ("It is not for the court to rewrite the parties' insurance agreement 
. . .  under the pretense of promoting an alternative social contract."). 
229. 89 A.2d 264 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1 952). 
230. See id. at 267. 
23 1 .  8 1 5  F.2d 1 78 ( 1 st Cir. 1 987). 
232. See id. at 1 8 1 .  
233 .  Id. 
234. Id. 
235. 682 P.2d 1 068 (Cal. 1 984). 
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employer and the employee. 236 Curiously, having so elevated the effect of 
the statutes, the judge went on to simply emphasize the familiar, traditional 
understanding that injured workers have a right to recover without regard 
to the fault ofthe employer, and that the employer' s  duty to pay damages 
is l imited by the terms of the statute.237 A number of other courts have 
described the workers' compensation statute as a social contract. 238 
In Staub v. Harris, 239 the court acknowledged an argument made by the 
parties that a "social contract" between taxpayers and state taxing 
authorities invalidated the use of private collection agencies to collect 
taxes .  240 Hinting at disappointment, the court wrote that " [i]n order to fall 
within the statutory language, they creatively evoke the concept of the 
social contract between the people and the government to show a quasi­
contractual transaction between the taxpayer and the local taxing units. "241 
Citizens dependent on municipal services and beneficiaries of government 
welfare programs enjoy a social contract with government, it is sometimes 
alleged . 242 Personal relationships and commitments are sometimes classified 
as social contracts. A judge described marriage as a social contract in a sad 
case involving parents alleged to have killed one child by force and another, 
who died of pneumonia, by neglect. 243 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Whether one takes a sympathetic244 or an unsympathetic245 philosophical 
view of social contract theory, one must admit the possibility that the 
intellectual foundations of American law include social contract theory. 
236. See id. at 1 076 ("The worker' s  compensation statutes created a '  social contract' between 
the employer and the employee."); accord Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co .  v. Imbraguglio, 697 
A.2d 885,  890 (Md. 1 997). 
237 .  See Rodgers, 682 P.2d at 1 076 (Reynoso, J., dissenting). 
2 3 8 .  See Archer v. Roadrunner Trucking, 930 P.2d 1 1 5 5,  1 1 5 8  (N.M. 1 996); Milwaukee 
County v. Labor & Indus. Review, 5 5 6  N.W.2d 340, 342 (Wis. Ct. App. 1 996).  
239.  626 F.2d 275 (3d Cir. 1 980).  
240 . See id. at 278 . 
24 1 .  !d. 
242. But see Reedy v.  Mullins, 456 F .  Supp. 9 5 5 ,  957 (W.D. Va. 1 978)  (rej ecting plaintiffs'  
reliance on the social contract as establishing a property right to fire protection). 
243. Westerville v.  Kalamazoo County Dep ' t ofSoc. Servs.,  5 34 F. Supp. 1 088,  1 1 02 (W.D 
Mich. 1 982 ). 
244 . See generally DAVID GAUTHIER, MORAL DEALING ( 1 986); DAVID GAUTH1ER, MORALS 
BY AGREEMENT ( 1 986); DAVID A.J.  RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION ( 1 986); 
BRIAN SKYRMS, EVOLUTION OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT ( 1 997). 
245 .  See generally CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, THE UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY INTO THE FUNDM1ENTALS OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 70 (Roy M. Mersky & J. Myron Jacobstein eds. , William S.  Hein & C o . ,  
reprint 1 974) ( 1 890 )  (stating that natural law "doctrine reaches the extreme l imits of absurdity 
in the social contract"). 
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Assuming, as a matter of history, that the nation and its Constitution have 
arguable social contractarian foundations, it is worth understanding the 
extent to which the courts may rest on those foundations in applying, 
interpreting, and making law. Moreover, examining the place of social 
contractarian thought in the rhetoric of judicial opinions illuminates the 
overall significance of an idea that has been, and remains, a major cultural 
phenomeno,n, particularly in legal, political, and philosophical circles. 246 The 
rewards of an improved understanding of the social contract legacy include 
a more complete portrait of American jurisprudence, and a more complete 
intellectual history of one rhetorical strand in American legal thought. 
Appeals to social contract theory-premised as they so often are on the 
assumption that our law has a special relationship to the social 
contractarian tradition-frame unavoidable judicial discretion in a familiar 
normative vocabulary that many people continue to find reassuring. It is 
pointless to quarrel with a judge who appeals to social contract theory 
merely to add l iterary flourish to his or her written opinion. My real 
concern is with judicial opinion writers who adduce social contract theory 
seemingly to determine, corroborate, or justify their conclusions. Social 
contract theory is too flexible to point with certainty in any one direction, 
particularly where the right answer is a matter of controversy, and 
particularly in the absence of detailed argument and analysis of the sort 
associated with the discipline of academic philosophy rather than the 
pragmatic discipline oflaw. As the examples of flexibility cited throughout 
this article show, using the apparatus of social contract theory, one can 
make the case for individual rights against government and likewise the 
case for government authority over individuals. Social contract theory must 
be interpreted in some detail before it can be applied with any confidence 
and rigor. 
Nearly six hundred years old, the early modern idea of the "social 
contract" is going strong. 247 I have described and illustrated judicial uses of 
246. The popular vitality of the modem idea of the social contract is in evidence in the realms 
of public law. It was in evidence in 1 994 when Republicans in Congress signed what they termed 
a "Contract with America," exploiting the pervasive habit of conceiving good and legitimate 
government as the product of political bargains. The idea was in evidence in 1 995 when 
Congressional Telecommunications Sub-Committee Chair Ed Markey said he wanted "to 
reinvigorate the social compact between broadcasters and the American people." Kim McAvoy, 
Markey Lays Out Legislative Agenda, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Oct. 10 ,  1 994, at 22. Materials 
for a continuing legal education course introduced a "social contract interpretation of the powers 
of eminent domain." Gavin M. Erasmus, Eminent Domain Jurisprudence, ALI-ABA Course of 
Study, Eminent Domain and Land Valuation Litigation, Scottsdale, Ariz., Jan. 6-8, 1 994 . A 1 997 
report of the Council for Aid to Education argued that the Morrill Act of 1 862 creating the land 
grant university guarantees that "all citizens who can profit from higher education wil l  have access 
to it," but that "there are signs this far-sighted social contract may soon be broken." 
24 7. See Gordon A Christenson, Using Human Rights Law to Inform Due Process and Equal 
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two terms employed in social contract theory :  "state of nature" and "social 
contract ."  What is the pay off for my work? First, this essay reveals to 
philosophers who work on social contract theory something about the roles 
various contractarian historical figures and ideas have played in legal 
developments in the United States .  Second, my essay reveals why 
humanists should be circumspect in making claims about the social contract 
tradition in American law. The history is ambiguous; it is easy to overstate, 
understate, and mis-state the impact of social contract theory. Clearly 
though, there have been significant post-revolutionary uses of the theory in 
American law. Finally, my essay should make judges and law clerks more 
self-conscious about their uses and potential abuses of social contractarian 
reasomng. 
Protection Analyses, 52 U. CIN. L. REv. 3, 1 2- 1 3  ( 1 983) ("consensus about international humm 
rights is replacing the original social contract theory underpinning the European liberal state tha 
formed the basis for our present constitutional system of rights"). 
